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This study seeks to analyze the role of oil in Saudi Arabia's 
foreign policy . In 1973 Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations success-
fully used their oil resources to apply pressure on the United States 
of America to modify her strong support of the State of Israel. Saudi 
Arabia played a significant role in the 1973 oil embargo . This thesis 
will examine Saudi Arabia's role in the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, and 
what prompted her participation, considering the fact that she is less 
radical than most of her Arab neighbors. The 1973 oil embargo was 
more successful than for example the 1967 embargo; Saudi Arabia's par-
ticipation helped to create this difference. The oil weapon will defi-
nitely be effective whenever applied uniformly by the Arabs against the 
west, especially now, and possibly in the near future. However, it will 
be unwise for the Arabs to continuously depend on the oil weapon since 
their oil resources cannot last forever. As Dr. Sheikh Rustum Ali sta-
ted in his book entitled Saudi Arabia and Oil Diploma~y, alternative 
energy resources are still abundant. The western hemisphere or indus-
trialized nations need only to apply their financial resources and tech-
nology to develop these resources . It obviously won't be an easy task 
for them to do so, now or in the near future, however it could be done. 
When this becomes a reality, the demand for oil will be sharply reduced, 
which will in turn deprive it of its present significance and of its 
role as a political weapon in international affairs. 
This study will examine the alternative sources of energy being 
developed in the west, notably nuclear energy. Nuclear energy plants 
are rapidly being built in the western industrialized nations despite 
some oppositions by citizen groups within. these various nations. There 
2 
is evidence that these projects are favourable to some oil producing na-
tions, including Saudi Arabia . Efficient use of energy is currently an 
important issue among the industrialized as well as the non-industria-
lized nations. The interest for alternative sources of energy is grow-
ing, partially due to higher oil prices. The high price of oil is forc-
ing the United States for example ( a victim of the 1973 Arab oil embar-
go) to rapidly seek alternative as well as new sources of energy. 
Solar energy is another alternative source of energy being de-
veloped. This along with nuclear energy could be significant alterna-
tives to oil successfully developed. 
The major propositions that will be supported in this thesis 
are: Saudi Arabia fully supported the 1973 oil embargo, (1) to show 
her support of the muslim Arab nations, thus promoting unity among them; 
(2) to show her fear of Israel's ideological stand, which she considers 
too extreme, and radical; (3) to have Israel withdraw from Arab lands 
occupied during the 196.7 war; (4) to gain respect and recognition from 
the western industrialized nations; (5) to take up a leadership role 
among the Arab nations in the Middle East, since her participation was 
crucial to the success of the embargo. Saudi Arabia has the largest 
known oil reserves in the world. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTEMPORARY SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
A brief mention of the geography, history and government of 
Saudi Arabia will be included in the introduction of this thesis , in 
order to give the reader some background information regarding Saudi 
Arabia. Until recently, very little work has been done regarding this 
desert kingdom. It owes its sudden thrust into international politics 
to its vast oil wealth. It is the hope of the author that the brief over -
view given in this chapter will aid the reader in understanding the 
various topics that will be discussed in this thesis. 
Geography 
1 
Saudi Arabia covers over four - fifths of the Arabian Penninsula, 
which is approximately three times the siee of the state of Texas. 
Saudi Arabia is well known today because of its vast oil wealth. The 
world's largest known oil resources are found in this desert kingdom. 
Its vast oil resources and conservative political orientation· makes her 
unique in the Middle East , and at the same time a friend to the West, 
Saudi Arabia borders the Red Sea and shares borders with 
I' 
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Jordan , Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, The United Arab Emirates, 
The Yemen Arab Republic, The People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen and Oman. Across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia are Egypt , 
The Sudan and Ethiopia . Most important of all, it faces the Israeli-
occupied Sinai Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aqaba. Its only major 
source of water falls within the 1, 560- mile coastline. Water from the 
coastline serves irrigation purposes for the limited arable land. 
There are five major regions. Along the coast of the Red Sea 
are located the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and also the diplo -
matic capital of Jeddah. These cities are located in the Hijaz region. 
The A sir region which is mountainous lies to the South along the Red 
2 
Sea. Najd occupies the central part of the country where the capital, 
Riyadh is located. The Eastern region, also known as Al- Hasa, is the 
site of the country's rich oil fields . The Trans-Arabian pipeline crosses 
the fifth region which is the Northern region. This pipeline also crosses 
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, leading to the Mediterranean Sea. 1 
People 
Saudis were predominately nomadic or semi- nomadic. How -
ever oil wealth has characteristically changed this pattern of lifestyle 
for most Saudis. The official language is Arabic, and the majority of 
Saudis are Muslims, who practice the puritanica l Wahhabi interpreta-
tion of Sunni Islam. There are no Jews in Saudi Arabia, and Christians 
are not permitted in the holy cities . Americans, Eur opeans, and 
3 
Christians from other Arab countries are employed in the oil industry. 
Government 
Prior to the establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
there was constant struggle for political power between the Bedouin 
tribes. Their constant struggles to control the country continued to 
the detriment of the peninsula. Tribes alternately supported each 
other when a strong leadership emerged. 2 
During the early part of the eighteenth century, Sheikh Muham-
mad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, described as a religious Imam initiated a re-
form movement in Arabia. The Najd province became his home and 
consequently the home of Wahhabism (the puritanical interpretation of 
Sunni Islam). The ruler of Najd was later expelled by the rival clan 
of Rashids from Najd to Kuwait. The exiled ruler's son, Abdul Aziz 
Ibn Saud, known to the west as Ibn Saud, reconquered Riyadh, which 
was the capital 9£ Najd in 1901. When Ibn Saud returned to Riyadh 
from exile in Kuwait, he brought along some followers who adhered to 
the Wahhabi sect of Islam. In 1924 Mecca was taken and the following 
year Medina was also taken . Ibn Saud was made king of Hejaz in 1926, 
and in 1932 the different portions of Arabia were joined into the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia. The pre sent kingdom has been independent since 
it was founded in the early twentieth century. 3 
Since its establishment, Saudi Arabia's political structure 
changed from primitive tribal-religious patriarchy into an absolute 
monarchy, with the king's power limited only by islamic law. 
The laws of Islam provide the country with civic and penal 
codes and also regulate religious problems . Religious law 
is the source of all legislation. But the king has the power 
to issue a decree where religious law is not applicable. The 
Koran is the supreme law of the kingdom . The Shariah, which 
is the foundation of the judicial system, is based on the Koran 
and the Sunnah (custom, law, exemplary life) of the prophet 
Muhammad. The judiciary is an independent agency in the 
state . The qua.dis (judges) usually judge according to the 
Hanbalite version of the Shariah Law. Punishment for murder 
is decapitation by the sword. Justice, when not theoretically 
in conflict with the Shariah, can also be governed by tribal and 
customary laws. 4 
4 
The Saudi Arabian government is based on a tribal system and 
the king is both the source of political power and head figure of the 
central government. The dual role of state and religious leader rests 
on the king, and he manages the administration through the royal 
court, tribal sheiks, the Council of Ministers and the regional and local 
emirs . However the final authority in all executive and legislative 
matters rests on the king though consultation on all levels of govern -
ment occurs. Prior to 1932, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud conducted 
everything alone, but after the administration of the country went be -
yond the power of a single person, changes were made. The kingdom 
grew rapidly because new territories were added to it. Prince Saud 
became leader of the kingdom when his father Ibn Saud died in 1953. 
Issues such as taxation and border control particularly were introduced 
through government decrees by Prince Saud, and they fall within the 
framework of the Koran and the Sha riah. 
5 
A Council of Ministers was added to the traditional structure of 
the Saudi Arabian central government. This Council is responsible 
for the budget and also supervises several government affairs. It is 
described as the "supreme authority" under the king. Regulations, 
treaties, international agreements and concessions are never decreed 
by the king unless they have been prepared by and meet the approval of 
the Council of Ministers. 5 
The history of the kingdom since 1953 to the present is charac-
• 
terized by several trends. In 1958 the kingdom was involved in a politi-
cal crisis with Egypt. Issues like the Palestinian question and the 
settlement of several border disputes were notable events. Among 
these trends is Saudi Arabia's leading role in the formation of OPEC 
{Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1960. On the 
domestic front, Saudi Arabia was mainly concerned with building a 
strong economy and the continued integration of the various functions 
within the population. In 1958, Crown Prince Faisal was appointed 
Prime Minister, thus taking charge of governmental affairs. Two 
years later, King Saud, Prince Faisal's brother reas sumed full control 
of governmental affairs from Prince Faisal. This created a struggle 
within the royal family. On November .5, 1964, King Saud was forced 
to abdicate, left Faisal lbn Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Rahman Al Faisal as king 
and ruler of Saudi Arabia. 
Faisal was described from the beginning as a strong and able 
6 
administrator. Faisal followed King Abd al-Aziz 1 s policies in respect 
to the Palestinian question. The old king, Abd Al-Aziz had argued that 
Palestine was an Arab state and that the Israelis had no right to take 
the land. He felt that the European Jews who had suffered so badly 
from Nazi extermination policies should return to their country of 
origin, because the Allied victory had removed the ~azi threat to their 
existence. From his point of view, the Jewish question was a Euro-
pean problem, and that the sins of the Europeans should not be expiated 
at the expense of the Arabs. 7 Like his predeceesor, King Faisal also 
viewed the Israelis as intruders. To force Israel to withdraw from all 
Arab occupied territories, Faisal was foxced to support the 1973 Arab 
oil embargo. He did not feel that settlement of the Arab-Israeli-Pales-
tinian question required the total elimination of the etate of Israel com-
pared to the views of the more radical Arab states like Libya. King 
Faisal's attempt to try and solve or settle a number of differences 
among the Arab states met with failure. He was more successful with 
his domestic reforms in Saudi Arabia. King Faisal wae assassinated 
on March 25, 1975 . Crown Prince Khalid became king, and has vowed 
to follow the policies that the late King Faisal pursued. 
History of Oil in Saudi Arabia 
There was no special interest in developing Saudi Arabia I s oil 
potentialities during the early 1920 1 s . However, when oil was being 
commercially produced in Bahrain around 1932, the various oil com-
.......... " 
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panies began to show some interest in obtaining concessions in Saudi 
Arabia . Standard of California was the first oil company to obtain ex-
ploration rights, after agreeing to King Ibn Saud I s terms. The terms 
dictated that oil companies must first agree on concessions before they 
could carry on any explorations . Standard of California's exploration 
was promising, so in 1936 it sold half an interest in its concessions to 
the Texas Oil Company for about $21 million, The terms were $3 mil-
lion payable in cash and $18 million to be paid back at the rate of twenty-
five cents on each barrel of oil produced. 8 
In l 938, oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the 
Damman field. This brought concession seekers in large numbers to 
Saudi Arabia . The Italians, Germans, and Japanese joined the Ameri-
cans. In May, 1939, King Ibn Saud granted concessions to Standard of 
California in the form of a supplemental agreement . The agreement 
dictated that a specified amount of money be charged for every metric 
ton of crude oil produced, plus some fixed rental charges until oil was 
produced in commercial quantities . The company was given exclusive 
rights to search, produce, refine and transport oil and oil products. 
There was no taxation or imposition; it was to supply free of charge 
limited quantities of gasoline and kerosene to the government for or-
dinary use, and this was not to be sold by the government , either to 
individuals in Saudi Arabia or abroad. 
ARAMCO (Arabian -American Oil Company) 
Aramco was the name given in 1944 to Standard of California. 
From its small beginning in 1933, Aramco developed into one of the 
greatest oil companies in the world . The first commercial oil field 
8 
was discovered at Damman in March, 1938, and around the end of 1951, 
it was producing 90, 000 barre ls per day. The Abu Hadriya field was 
discovered in March, 1940. The Abqaiq field was discovered in Novem -
ber of 1940, and by the end of 1951, it was producing 590,000 barrels 
per day. The Qatif and Amin Dar fields were discovered in June, 1945, 
with a daily production of 20, 000 and 150, 000 barrles respectively. 
The off-shore well Safaniya was discovered in May, 1951. By the end 
of 1953, 137 wells were producing about 845,000 barrels per day. 
Table l shows the rate of production achieved within fifteen years. 
Pipelines and refineries (the most notable is Ras Tanura), as well as 
tanker loading stations were built. 
After experiencing a slowdown in growth rates following the 
Arab-Israeli War of 196 7, the production of oil in Saudi Arabia has 
been constantly increasing. It rose from 356. 6 million barrels in 1955 
to 1, 704. 8 million in 1971, and 2,201. 8 million barrels in 1972 9 (see 
Table 2). In 1972 for instance, Saudi Arabia was responsible for 60 
percent of the total increase in oil production in the non-communist 
world. Similarly, after concluding the profit-sharing agreement be-
tween Saudi Arabia and Aramco, the country's oil revenues also rose. 
9 
TABLE 1 
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL PRODUCTION , 1938-1954 
Year In Tons In Barrels Daily Average {in barrels l 
1938 65,618 580,000 
1939 521, 2 14 3,934,000 11, 000 
1940 672,154 5,075,000 50,000 
1941 570,046 4,310,000 12,000 
1942 600,351 4, 530, 000 12,000 
1943 645,860 4,868,000 13,000 
1944 1,034,603 7,794,000 21,000 
1945 2,825,990 21,311,000 59,000 
1946 7,899,675 59,944,000 165,000 
1947 11,813,668 89,852,000 246,000 
1948 18,751,270 142,853,000 390,000 
1949 22,820,783 174,009,000 477,000 
1950 26, 196, 852 199,547,000 547,000 
1951 36,608,585 277,963,000 770,000 
1952 39,870,805 301,861,000 825,000 
1953 40,887, 754 . 308,294,000 845,000 
1954 46,174,073 347,800,000 953,000 
SOURCE: Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East Oil and the 
Great Powers (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 309. 
10 
The profit-sharing agreement is also commonly referred to as the 
1150-50 11 profit sharing agreement. This agreement was reached on 30 
December 1950. Oil revenues rose from $56. 7 million in 1950 to $110 
million in 1951. lO In addition, it rose from $340. 8 million in 1955 to 
$1,149 . 7 million in 1970, and then jumped to $1,944.9 million in 1971. 11 
Since then oil revenues have been constantly rising, reaching the amount 
of $2,734.1 million in 1972 (see Table 3). This continuous rise is due 
to higher oil exports and higher crude oil prices used in calculating 
Saudi Arabian income tax. Saudi Arabian oil revenues were estimated 
at $4. 7 billion for 1973, and were expected to reach $21 billion in 
1974, 12 and $33 billion by 1976. 
Aramco Relations with the Government 
The "Nationalization" of Aramco has been progressing in stages 
since 1973, when the Saudi government acquired 25 per cent stake in 
the producer as sets of the company. This stake covers drilling equip -
ment, storage tanks and port facilities, but does not include the refin-
ery at Ras Tanura, which processes about 140,000 barrels per day of 
natural gasoline liquids and 500, 000 barrels per day of crude; nor does 
it cover the Trans-arabian pipeline (tapline) which runs from Qaisumah 
to Sidon in Lebanon. Tapline stopped operating in 1975 because it 
proved uneconomical initially, and finally because the Lebanese Civil 
War erupted . 
Discussions have been going on since 1974 in regards to the 
l l 
TABLE 2 
SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION, 1967-72 
Annual Production Daily Average Percent 
Year (million barrels) (million barrels) Growth 
1967 l, 023. 8 2.8 7.8 
1968 l, 114. l 3.0 8.8 
1969 1,173.9 3.2 5. 3 
1970 1,386,3 3.8 18. 1 
1971 1,740.8 4.8 25. 1 
1972 2,201.8 6. O 26.4 
SOURCE: Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976). 
TABLE 3 
CRUDE OIL OUTPUT AND GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUES 
Year Output Revenues (Million Barrels) (Million Dollars) 
1938 o. 5 0.2 
1945 2 l. 3 5. 0 
1948 142.9 31. 5 
1950 199.5 56.7 
1951 278.0 11 o. 0 
1955 356.6 340.8 
1956 366.8 290. 2 
1960 481. 4 333.7 
1965 804.9 664. 1 
1967 1,023.8 903.6 
1970 1,386.7 1, 214. 0 
1971 1,740.6 1,884.9 
1972 2,202. 0 2,744.6 
1973 2,772.6 4,340.0 
1974 3, 09 5. 1 22,573.5 
1975 2,582.5 25,676.2 
SOURCE: Ramon Knauerhase, The Saudi Arabian Economx 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 194, 287. 
12 
final 100 percent nationalization of Aramco and the future role of the 
four U.S. partners as explorers, producers and marketers for the 
company. By September 1976, it became clear that a takeover was 
agreed upon. The four companies (Exxon, Texaco, Standard of Cali-
fornia and Mobile Oil), were to receive a book price of their total 
assets and a guarantee to sell the companies around 7 million barrels 
of crude oil a day for marketing abroad. Since the companies were 
allowed in the agreement to continue exploration and production, they 
would be paid a premium on new reserves they discovered, and also a 
fee of around 21 cents would be given to them for each barrel lifted by 
Aramco, or a flat fee of 15 cents for each barrel lifted in Saudi Arabia. 
These incentives were given by the government so that Aramco 
would continue to search for oil in the country. This is very important 
since Aramco has continuously been discovering new oil resources each 
year in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's probable reserves as of 1975 
have been estimated at nearly 180 million barrels, while proved re-
13 
serves stand at 107,857 million barrels during the same year. With 
the limit which Saudi Arabia has placed on production, that is 8. 5 mil-
lion barrels per day averaged over one year, the proved reserves 
estimated to last about 35 years from 1975 and if the probable reserve 
holds, production could continue for another 22 years from the same 
year. 
Another reason why the Saudi government wants to keep Aramco 
13 
is simply because it will be assured of a stable market. In 1975 Aram-
co was committed to marketing about 7 million barrels of oil a day t o 
the industrialized west. This is also very important to Saudi Arabia 
for she depends largely on oil for her economic development. Although 
Saudi Arabia currently has no cash r equirements to satisfy, she still 
needs a market for that matter a stable market for her oil resources. 
She must continue to utilize her oil resources for r elevant development 
purposes before either her oil resources run out , or the major con-
sumers turn to alternative energy sources . This will be a part of one 
of the propositions in this thesis. 
Statement of purpose 
This study seeks to analyze the role of oil in Saudi Arabia's 
foreign policy. In 1973 Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations success-
fully used their oil resources to apply pressure on the United States of 
America to modify her strong support of the State of Israel. Saudi 
Arabia played a significant role in the 1973 oil embargo. This thesis 
will examine Saudi Arabia's role in the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, and 
what prompted her participation considering the fact that she is less 
radical than most of her Arab neighbors. The 1973 Arab o il embargo 
was more successful than for example the 1967 embargo. Saudi 
Arabia's participation helped to create this difference. The oil weapon 
will definitely be effective whenever applied uniformly by the Arabs 
against the west , especially now, and possibly in the near future. How-
14 
ever, it will be unwise for the Arabs to continuous ly depend on the oil 
weapon since their oil resources cannot last forever . As Dr. Sheikh 
Rustum Ali stated in his book entitled Saudi A r abia and Oil Diplomacy, 
alternative energy resources are still abundant. The western hemis -
phere o r industrialized nations need only to apply their financial re-
sources and technology to develop these resources. It obviously won't 
be an easy task for them to do so, now or in the near future , however it 
could be done. When this becomes a reality, the demand for oil will be 
sharply reduced, which will in turn deprive it of its present significance 
and of its role as a political weapon in international affair s . 
This study will examine the alternative sources of energy being 
developed in the west, notably nuclear energy. Nuclear energy plants 
are r apidly being built in the western industrialized nations de spite 
some oppositions by citizen groups within these va r ious nations. The r e 
is evidence that these projects are favorable to some oil producing 
nations, including Saudi A r abia. Efficient use of energy is currently 
an important is sue among the industrialized as well as the non-
industrialized nations. The interest fo r alternative sources of energy 
is growing, partially due to higher oil prices. The high price of oil is 
forcing the United States for example (a victim of the 1973 A r ab oil 
embargo ) to rapidly seek alternative as well as new sources of energy. 
Solar ene r gy is anothe r alternative source of ene r gy being de -
veloped. This along with nuclear energy could be significant a lterna -
tives to oil when successfully developed. 
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Statement of Propositions 
These are the major propositions that will be supported in this 
thesis: Saudi Arabia fully supported the 1973 oil embargo, (1) to show 
her support of the muslim Arab nations, thus promoting unity among 
them; (2) to show her fear of Israel ' s ideological stand, which she con-
siders too extreme, and radical; (3) to have Israel withdraw from A rah 
lands occupied during the 196 7 war; ( 4) to gain respect and recognition 
from the western industrialized nations; (5) to take up a leadership role 
among the Arab nations in the Mid - East, since her participation was 
cruc ial to the success of the embargo. Saudi Arabia has the largest 
oil (known) reserves in the world. 
Methodology 
The methodology followed is a descriptive analysis with some 
statistical data to substantiate certain statements or propositions. 
Political, economic and international aspects of petroleum will be cover-
ed in this study. However, more emphasis will be placed on the politi-
cal aspects of the use of petroleum as a weapon in international affairs. 
The oil embargo and Arab - Israeli problem vis - a-vis Saudi Arabia will 
be the major focus of this study. Finally, I will draw some significant 
conclusions in the final chapter of the thesis . 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One contains 
some backgTound information about Saudi Arabia . Included in this back-
ground information are Geography, People, Government and History of 
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Oil in Saudi Arabia. The Statement of Purpose, Statement of Proposi-
tions and Methodology are also included. These will aid the reader in 
understanding what will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Chapter 
Two deals with the relationship between Saudi Arabia and OPEC (Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and OAP EC (Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries); i.e., Saudi policies and OPEC, 
Saudi policies and OAPEC, as well as the policies of other gulf states 
in both OPEC and OAPEC; included are the policies of Algeria and 
Libya vis-a-vis OPEC and OAPEC. Since the thesis deals with Saudi 
petro-diplomacy, her policies and those of the other oil exporting coun-
tries who combine to form OPEC and OAPEC should be explored vis-a-
vis the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Chapter 
Three is entirely devoted to the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
and the ''united 11 Arab efforts in trying to promote the Palestinian-Arab 
cause. Chapter Four deals with the Saudi policy and the Arab oil em-
bargo, i.e., what role Saudi Arabia played during the oil embargo. It 
is obvious that the success of the 19 73 oil embargo was due to the Saudi 
participation. Chapter Five deals with the quest for energy security by , 
the industrialized nations. The question of alternative energy sources 
being discovered is discussed. Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, 
summarizes the various topics and points discussed, and makes some 
general recommendations. 
This study is based on Saudi Arabia, oil diplomacy and power 
pressure. Very little work has been done within the disciplines of 
political science and international relations on this subject. So the 
author hopes that this thesis will be a significant contribution to both 
disciplines. 
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CHAPTER II 
SAUDI ARABIA AND OPEC 
The Middle East is still generally viewed as a developing area. 
The citizens of the area still lack political experience and administra-
tive skills. A sudden influx of money and sophistication in technologi-
cal innovations within one generation has drastically changed the region. 
Oil revenues made these changes possible. However, the various 
count ries had to struggle against the giant oil companies that were 
ope rating within their boundaries. These oil companies were outsiders 
to the region and they have amassed great wealth for themselves . As 
a result, they were always viewed with suspicion in the area. 
The best solution to this problem of being cheated would natur -
ally be to unite. If all the members of the area had united against 
foreign oil companies, they could possibly have obtained their maxi-
mum rights and prevented the foreigners from cheating and exploiting 
them of their God -given treasures. But unity presupposed a number 
of factors: That a sense of common objectives existed and continues 
to exist; that a willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of a com-
mon cause existed; that the members of the union possessed the ability 
for sustained planned effort to achieve the distant goal; and that there 
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existed suitable, able and skillful leaders who were recognized by all 
members, as the personification of the ideal of unity and most impor -
14 
tant, were trusted by all. These prerequisites did not always exist 
in the different moves for unity in the Middle East. 
Since 1959, three organizations were set up in the Middle East 
to encourage unity against the oil companies: The Arab Petroleum 
Congress, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
and its related organization, The Organization of Arab Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OAPEC). For this paper, I will neglect all aspects 
dealing with the Arab Petroleum Congress and thereby concentrate on 
the organizations that are still in existence--OPEC and OAPEC. The 
present essay will trace the origins of OPEC and the evolution of its 
program. 
The representatives of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Venezuela assembled in Baghdad on 14 September 1960, to form the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Their immediate 
concern was with the pricing practices of the major international oil 
companies. The oil producing countries were keenly conscious of the 
fact that their oil revenues, accounting for most of their government 
budgets, depended on prices set by a tightly interlocking group of com-
panies with headquarters in the United States or in Europe. 
The companies decided where and when to prospect for oil. It 
were the companies again that decided how much oil to produce once it 
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was found, and it were the companies that , in the light of their assess-
ment of the market, set the price at which it would be sold. Although 
the companies operating in each country were legally distinct, there 
was a pattern of interlocking ownership: British Petroleum (BP), 
Shell, Mobil, and Exxon were part-owners of the three companies oper-
ating in Iraq; Exxon, Texaco, California Standard, and Mobil jointly 
owned Aramco, which operated in Saudi Arabia; Exxon, Shell and Gulf, 
through affiliates operated separately in Venezuela; Gulf and BP jointly 
held shares in the Iranian consortium that replaced BP after the crisis 
of 1951-54. In the world at large, between 1949 and 1950, these seven 
companies controlled 65 percent of proved reserves of petroleum out-
side the Soviet bloc, 55 percent of its production, 57 percent of all re-
finery capacity and major pipelines, and through ownership of long-
term leases, at least 67 percent of all privately owned tanker space. 
In 1959 and 1960, the companies once more displayed their 
control and power by cutting prices all along the line, in an effort to 
compete with coal in the rapidly growing energy markets in Europe 
and Japan. Such activities prompted governments of oil - producing 
countries to coordinate policies . Venezuela had put out feelers to 
Middle East governments as early as 1947 for this purpose, Iraq and 
Saudia Arabia in 1953 had concluded an agreement calling for exchange 
of information and periodic consultation regarding petroleum. And an 
Arab petroleum conference in Cairo in 1959 adopted a resolution insist-
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ing that any changes in posted price should be discussed with the gov-
ernment of the producing country. The major initiatives of this La.tin 
American - Middle Easte rn rapprochement that was to form the basis of 
OPEC were taken by the Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocar-
bons, Juan Perez Alfonso, and Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Sheikh 
Abdullah Tariki. 
The member countries of OPEC today embrace different politi -
cal complexions, levels of development and cultures in Asia, Africa 
and La.tin America. Full national control of their oil resources, which 
included the control to transportation, refining and distribution later 
became another goal sought by OPEC member nations. 
Between 1951 and 1953, Iran attempted to take unilateral action 
against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was then the concession 
holder. This met with resistance from the major oil companies, and 
to show their solidarity, they instituted a boycott on Iranian oil and 
thus largely thwarted Iran's designs. 15 The conflict ended in a formal 
recognition of the nationalization , however the basic pattern of control 
and profit-sharing was the same as that of her neighboring countries. 
Similarly, when Iraq nationali zed a large portion of the Iraq petroleum 
company 's concession area in 1961, and late r refused offers of settle-
ment, the companies penalized it by restricting production in favor of 
a higher output in other producing countries of the region. 16 
The position of weakness characterized by oil producing countries 
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and the corresponding strength of the companies could be att ributed to 
three, interrelated factors: " The existence of a buyers' market, the 
self- sufficiency of the United States as a producer and consumer of oil, 
and the dominant position of the major oil companies. 111 7 These fac-
tors were completely reversed in the early seventies . The OPEC 
members as a group could now afford to worry less about production 
increases and concentrate on prices. Individual member states have 
gradually accepted output restrictions as a legitimate and viable policy 
alternative . Some countries accepted the policy purely on grounds for 
conservation, or on the mobility to use effectively the revenue surpluses 
that even before 1973 had been accumulated by some states . Saudi 
Arabia is an example of this, as opposed to Iran that is still concerned 
about rapid economic development and a strong military status. 
Until the outbreak of the October war, it was possible to find 
many common denominators that held together the solidarity of OPEC 
members . This community of interests was likely to prevail ove r 
potential differences, so long as major political differences did not 
become involved. 18 The Arab group (OAPEC) within OPEC is an ex-
ception in that it became directly involved with the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, and also because it admitted and occasionally practiced the use 
of oil as a weapon in the political struggle. This was not easily ac-
complished . 
FIGURE 1 
1973 Crude Petroleum Production and Petroleum Product 
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(million barrels per day) 
~---------
,. 0 
- . ~ - . 7 - S-~ - -..3 -14-. I 
(production minus consumption} 
23 
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Project Independence 
Report, November 1974. 
FIGURE 2 
1973 Import Levels and Proportion of 1973 Imports from 
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Saudi Arabia 1 s Policies in OAP EC 
The fourth Arab - Israeli war broke out on October 6, 1973. A 
conference of Arab oil ministers was held in Kuwait on the 17th of the 
same month. At this conference it was decided that the oil weapon 
would be used for the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict . 
They agreed in a binding decis i on to reduce their exports by 
a minimum of 5 percent as compared with the average Septem-
ber output, and to follow this reduction with further cuts of 5 
percent per month until the completion of the total withdr awal 
of Israel from the territories occupied in 196 7 , and the r estor -
ation of the rights of the Palestinians, or until the production 
of every individual country r eaches the point where its economy 
does not permit any further reduction without detriment to its 
national or A r ab obligations. l 9 
Thus, the oil importing nations were to be t reated accor ding to 
their stand on the Arab - Israeli conflict: The friendl y ones were to be 
exempted; the unfriendly and neutral ones were t o be subject to varying 
degrees of restriction. It was agreed that an embargo would be applied 
on the United States due to her unfriendly policy toward Arabs. One 
Arab nation opposed the decisions and withdrew. This nation was Iraq. 
The others; Abu Dhabi , Algeria, Bahrein, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, 
Qatar , Saudi Arabia and Syr ia appr oved the actions unanimousl y . De-
spite this solidar ity, the various Arab states had different underlying 
attitudes in r egards to the embargo. 
Saudi Arabia hel d the key position, both economically and polit-
ically in OAPEC . Saudi Arabia was producing 8. 5 million barrels of 
oil per day on the eve of the war, and around the same period, the 
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kingdom accounted for 40 percent of the total Arab production. With 
this, Saudi Arabia was bound to be influential. Also , in addition to 
being a country of wealth, Saudi Arabia is viewed as the center of 
traditional Islam. This role has extended her influence beyond the 
Middle East . She was also an acknowledged leader in the conservative 
camp of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has been cooperative with 
Egypt, another moderate influential state, in devel oping a general 
Arab strategy in relations with the outside world. 
Despite the militancy present among the various Palestinian 
groups, Saudi Arabia supported the general Palestinian st ruggle for 
the recognition of their rights, and provided aid to the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization (PLO). The late King Faisal's dedication to the 
Palestinian cause was strengthened by his interest in Je rusalem, and 
his often proclaimed determination to see its Arab part restored to 
Arab control, so that he might make a pilgrimage to it s holy places. 
Unfortunately, he died without realizing his dream. 
The increased dedication to the Palestinian cause made Saudi 
Arabia deviate from her proclaimed policy of "not m ixing oil with 
politics 11 • If during the previous crises ( 1956, 196 7) Saudi Arabia had 
resorted to the use of the oil weapon, they had done so reluctantly, and 
only for brief periods . ZO However, by early 1973, the continuous dead -
lock in the Arab-Israeli issue caused King Faisal to accept with greater 
willingness the idea of using oil as a political weapon in Arab;...American 
TABLE 4 
CRUDE OIL OUTPUT BY MAJOR PRODUCER , 1973- 77 (' 000 barrels) 
1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 
Middle Eaet OPEC members 
Saudi Arabia + 3,358,906 3, 140, 088 2, 5 83, 18 7 3,096,211 2,773,887 
Iran 2,079,991 2, 166,417 1,965,404 2,210,627 2,152,228 
Iraq+ 826,900 834,810 820,545 680,860 717,676 
Libya+ 757,244 699,504 551,251 550,784 796,423 
Kuwait+ 706,551 786,929 760,888 930, 142 1,103,165 
Abu Dhabi+ 608,373 582,580 511,914 516,125 476,348 
Algeria+ 401,480 393,487 345,183 372, 753 391,890 
Qatar+ 160,820 178,120 160, 343 189,248 207,924 
Dubai+ 116,452 114,681 92,842 88, 12 7 80,202 
Total 9,016,717 8,896,616 7,791,557 8,634,877 8,699.743 
Other OPEC members 
Venezuela 816,820 833,077 855, 134 1,086,332 1, 228, 590 
Nigeria 765,475 758,057 651,949 822,702 750,675 
Indonesia 615,821 549,792 481,490 501,854 488,550 
Gabon 81,284 81,510 81,980 81,160 55,047 
Ecuador 66,270 68,372 58,753 64, 546 76,221 
Total 2,345,670 2,290,808 2,129,306 2,556,594 2,599,083 
Total OPEC members 11,362,387 11,187,424 9,920,863 11,191,471 11,298,826 
Non-OPEC Middle East states 
Oman 124,760 133,795 124,198 106,046 106,926 
Bahrain+ 20,429 21,287 22,309 24,597 24, 948 
Egypt::<*+ 152, 205 "~ 119, 720~' 81, 061 53.715 60,483 N co 
TABLE 4--Continued 
1977 1976 1975 
Non-OPEC Middle East states (continued) 
Syria + 73, OQQ );c 70, 08Q)l{ 65,930 
Turkey 18, zso ~c 18,615)l{ 21,719 
Total 388,644 363,497 315,217 
Total Middle East 9,405 , 361 9,260, 113 8,106,774 
Other major states 
Soviet Union 4,013,100 3,822,000 3,600,025 
us 3 , 617,940* 3,558,731 3,647,736 
+ Members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
* 
Estimate 
** Including Israeli-occupied Sinai 
SOURCE: Oil & Gas Journal, Oklahoma, U, S., 1974-78. 
1974 
54,352 
24, 555 
263,265 
8, 898, 142 
3,373,650 
3,818,683 
(OAPEC) 
1973 
38, 1 70 
24,273 
254,800 
8,954,543 
3,140,288 
3,995,326 
N 
'° 
diplomacy. On at least three occasions, King Faisal expressed his 
conce r n, and issued warnings to the United States; first through his 
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oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed Yamani; to certain Amer ican cabinet mem-
bers in April, then through Aramco's parent companies in May; and 
finally through Newsweek and the BBC (British Broadcast Co. ) in 
21 September, 1973 . 
The idea that the oil weapon would have to be employed by 
adoption of restrictive measures was further emphasized through a 
se ries of consultations that King Faisal had throughout the Summer of 
1973, with President Sadat of Egypt. "But the basic Saudi philosophy 
in this respect was to avoid mentioning if possible, any specifically 
punitive actions. 1122 Saudi Arabia and for that matter, King Faisal 
was out to alert world public opinion about the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
To this effect , Saudi Arabia favored adopting a decision on production 
cutbacks at the Kuwait meeting of l 7 October , 1973, and therefore sup -
ported only a recommendation when the issue of the embargo came up. 
King Faisal had sent an important message to President Nixon before 
the October 17th meeting in which he asked the U.S. to stop assishng 
Israel in the war. However, President Nixon seemed at that time to 
have little regard fo r King Faisal's warnings. On October 19th, King 
Faisal learned of the president I s decision to request Congress for an 
authorization to provide $2. 5 billion for arms assistance to Israel. 
This prompted King Faisal I s decision to impose an embargo. This 
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decision wa s extremely crucial, because Saudi Arabia ce rtainly helped 
make the embargo a total success . Also, the success of the embargo 
helped the Arabs to gain some degree of respect and recognition, from 
the west in particular. This alone was a worthwhile accomplishment. 
Policies of Other Gulf States 
Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrein are the smaller Arab 
states of the Gulf. These states have traditionally been close allies to 
Saudi Arabia on several key is sues . When King Faisal decided on an 
embargo, these states followed suit. Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrein 
have broadly similar political structures, and tendencies towa rd Saudi 
Arabia, These Arab states can be described as conservative, prudent 
and in favor of cooperation with the west. Kuwait followed a more in-
dependent policy than the other three smaller Gulf states . Also, in 
contrast to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait has a constitutional monarchy with a 
Parliament. In addition, its close proximity to Iraq and Iran forced 
it to pay close attention to the trends and moods in these two compara -
tively powerful countries . "Consequently, despite its basic conserva-
tism, Kuwait was more sensitive to domestic and external pressures 
than were either Saudi Arabia or the smaller Gulf states. 1123 
If Saudi Arabia stood at one end of the Arab spectrum, Iraq 
can be placed at the othe r. Ir aq is anti-imperialist and radical in its 
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domestic and foreign policies. Since the revolution of 1958, Iraq not 
only had a history of tense relations with Washington and London, but 
also regarded itself as outside the free world. Linked by a treaty of 
friendship with the Soviet Union and with a Baath dominated cabinet, 
consisting of two communist ministers, Iraq was largely isolated from 
the Arab community. It maintained friendly ties with revolutionary 
Libya and Marxist-oriented South Yemen. This could partially explain 
why Iraq showed such hostility and skepticism to Saudi attitudes on the 
oil embargo, At the October, 1973 meeting in Kuwait, the Iraqi dele-
gation resisted the decision on production cutbacks and acc~pted the 
idea of selective embargoes . It insisted that the cutback policy did not 
distinguish sufficiently between friendly and unfriendly consumer states; 
instead it proposed a more radical policy, which required an immediate 
nationalization of foreign oil companies, as well as banks and any other 
assets or enterprises of hostile countries that are located in the Mid-
dle East. 24 To show their total support for such a policy, Iraq, on 
October 7, 1973, immediately following the outbreak of the war, na .... 
tional American holdings in the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) , 
which consisted of shares owned by Exxon and Mobil. Such an action 
appeared too radical to be acceptable to the more conservative Arab 
regimes. This placed Iraq on a lonely course at the Kuwait conference , 
and it thus prompted its withdrawal from the meeting, and all other 
meetings of the Arab oil ministers held throughout the period of the 
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crises of 1973 -74. However, Iraq also joined in the embargo against 
the designated consumer states . It only refused to cut back production 
and exports to other consumer nations that were not included in the 
embargo. 
The Positions of Algeria and L ibya 
Libya and Algeria deserve some mention a l ong with other par-
ticipants at the Kuwait meeting. Algeria had the characteristics of the 
moderate Arab states, as well as those of the radicals. Algeria had 
to struggle bitterly to gain its independence from France, and since 
then its regimes have been known for their militancy, in both the pan-
Arab causes and the question of Palestine. Algeria ranks below most 
Arab states in the total production of oil (see Table 4), however it ac -
cepted the Saudi and Egyptian idea of a partial boycott , based on pro-
duction cutbacks, even though it would be expected to suffer financia lly 
by taking such an action. Also, Algeria at the time of the 1973-74 
crisis had a large volume of its exports going to the Netherlands, and 
this was one of the consumer nations listed for a total embargo, along 
with the United States . 
Libya's Colonel Al-Qadhafi followed a militant revolutionary 
ideology, thus making Libya sympathetic to Iraq's position. H owever, 
Colonel Qadhafi's strong Islamic orientation clashed with Iraq's tolera-
tion of Moscow and Communism. After attempts to unite with Egypt 
failed in 1972, relations between the two countries were strained. Also, 
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Colonel Qadhafi was unhappy at having been excluded from the planning 
and waging of the October war. However, Libya did not want to further 
isolate itself from the Arab community by refusing to go along with the 
oil embargo. If Libya had adopted Iraq's policy of nationalizing Ameri-
can interests, the results might prove different. When Iraq made its 
move, it was viewed as an accounting operation, since Exxon and 
Mobil, the two American companies concerned, were only remote 
shareholders in an operating company--the Basra Petroleum Company. 
The action did disrupt the Basra Petroleum Company's production pro-
cess. With a few exceptions, American companies in Libya held di -
rect concessions, and this formed a large portion of Libya I s produc-
tion. To nationalize them, during the period of crisis could obviously 
affect Libya's production and consequently result in a denial of sup-
plies to many consumers in excess of the cutbacks proposed in Kuwait. 
So to secure its own interests as well, Libya went along with the 
moderate cutback policy proposed at the Kuwait conference. Libya, 
unlike Iraq complied fully with the embargo policy. 
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CHAPTER III 
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
Saudi Arabia has maintained a long history of involvement in 
the disputes between the Jews and Arabs over the question of Pales -
tine, which later became known as the State of Israe l. King Ibn Saud 
was among the first Saudi leaders who voiced strong support for the 
Palestinian-Arab cause. He maintained that Palestine is an Arab land 
to which the Jews have no right. Saudi Arabia has also provided str ong 
financial assistance to the Pa lestinians . 
On January 8, 1940, H . St . John Philby, an adviser to lbn Saud, 
suggested a plan to the King that was aimed at solving the Palestinian 
problem. Philby1 s solution was that Palestine -should be left to the 
Jews, and the displaced Arabs should be resettled somewhere else, at 
the expense of the Jews, who would place a sum of L20 million at the 
disposal of the king fo r this purpose. 25 When he presented the plan 
to Ibn Saud, the king asked Philby to keep the matter strictly confiden-
tial, since his safety might be in danger if other Arabs heard about it. 26 
On February 12, 1945 , Ibn Saud left Jeddah on board the Amer-
ican destroyer Quincy to meet with P res ident Roosevelt, who was re -
turning from the Yalta Conference . They met at the Great Bitter Lake 
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on the Suez Canal. The topic of their discussion centered on the Pales-
tinian question. Roosevelt assured Ibn Saud that he would avoid doing 
anything that might harm the Palestinian-Arab cause. Roosevelt also 
stated that "the U.S. government would make no change in its basic 
policy in Palestine without full and prior consultation with both the Jews 
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and Arabs. 11 
After Ibn Saud met with Roosevelt, he met with Churchill on the 
shore of Lake Karun . Churchill clearly stated to Ibn Saud that his 
policy was to maintain Palestine as a "national home for the Jews"· 
Ibn Saud strongly disagreed with such a policy. He told Churchill that 
Palestine is an Arab land to which the Jews have no right. 2 8 
V iolence between the Arabs and Jews which had been prevalent 
since the end of World War II continued in Palestine. When war broke 
out in May of 1948 between the Arabs and Jews , Saudi Arabia only sent 
a few units of its troops to Palestine. 2 9 Ibn Saud cooperated in the 
boycott of Israel, however he did not cut off oil production, nor did he 
cancel the American oil concession. 3 o He expressed his disappoint-
ment at Roosevelt who did not stick to his promise. lbn Saud maintain-
ed that the European Jews should return to their home countrie s in 
Europe, since Germany was defeated in World War ll, which supposedly 
eliminated all Nazi threats to the Jew s. 
In 1956, Egypt was attacked by Britain, F rance, and Israel. 
Saudi Arabia condemned the attack and called on all Arabs to do like-
\ 
wise. Also. Saudi Arabia strongly supported Egypt's nationalization 
of the Suez Canal. 
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Again in June, 1967, war broke out between the Jews and Arabs. 
This time the confrontation was mainly between Israel and three other 
Arab states, Egypt. Syria and Jordan. This war became known as the 
Six-day War which was won by Israel. For the first time Saudi Arabia. 
then under King Faisal showed less concern about the outcome of a war 
between the Arabs and Israel, simply because he had strained rela-
tions with Egyptian President Nasser. "But aware of Arab nationalist 
sentiments, King Faisal called for the annihilation of Israel, and sent 
troops to Jordan, although they did not engage in extensive fighting. 1131 
Jamil Baroody, the Saudi Arabian representative at the United 
Nations emphasized in a speech given before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, that " the whole creation of Israel was illegal and im-
moral, to say the least " . 32 According to Baroody, conquerors had 
come and gone from Alexander the Great, the Romans, and the Cru-
saders, to the mandatory powers. He said of them: 
Conquerors all , but the bones of their troops have. through-
out the ages, bleached our soil, and their works are more 
relics for the tourists to see. They are gone- - all _.gone--
those conquerors of yore. But the Arabs, in spite of all the 
vicissitudes that have shaped their destiny:, still remain--
approximately a hundred million of.them. 33 
A summit meeting was held in Khartoum after the end of the 
1967 war. At this meeting, Saudi Arabia pledged $140 million to the 
Arab cause. Even though Saudi Arabia was experiencing a financial 
crisis during this period, it made all efforts to fulfill its financial 
commitment. 
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Relations did not improve much between the Arabs and Israel 
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. When Nasser died and Sadat suc-
ceeded him, he immediately pointed out that only through war could 
the problems between the Arabs and Israel be solved. Sadat stated in 
April, 1973, during an interview with Newsweek, that "everything in 
this country is now being mobilized in earnest for a resumption of the 
34 battle. 11 
In October, 1973, war broke out again between the Arabs and 
Israel. Saudi Arabia played a significant role in this war , which also 
became known as the Yorn Kippur War. Although it was reported that 
Saudi forces were placed on alert when the war started, there was no 
evidence to show whether they were actually involved in direct combat. 
However, Saudi Arabia led ten Arab oil-producing nations in using 
their oil wealth as a political weapon. On October 17, 1973 Saudi 
Arabia and the other Arab oil-producing nations agreed to reduce by 
5 percent each month the amount of oil they export. The following day, 
Saudi Arabia cut oil production by 10 percent to put pres sure on the 
United States. On October 20, 1973, a total oil embargo was imposed 
on the United States. This move placed Saudi Arabia in a position of 
leadership among the Arab states. Since oil is an extremely important 
source of energy for the western industrialized nations, which are 
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heavily dependent on oil, the use of the Arab oil weapon was effective. 
King Faisal, like his predecessors, strongly believed that the 
creation of a Jewish state within the Muslim world was due to the 
communist-zionist-imperialist conspiracy against Islam. King Faisal 
said: 
We cannot and will not ignore the fo r ces which oppose our 
efforts today. There a r e the evil forces of imperialism and 
the sinister forces of Judaism and Zionism and the forces of 
Communism. As to imperia lism, it opposes our preaching 
of Islam because it knows that Islam is a religion of brother-
hood, a religion of peace, a religion of love, a religion of 
equality ... As to the forces of Zionism , they know that 
coope ration between Muslims would put an end to the evil ex-
pansionist ideas of international Zionism in Is lamic and Arab 
countries. As fo r the Communist , they are attacking us be-
cause the Islamic movement is going to dest r oy all that Com-
munism stands for . . . 3 5 
It was King Faisal 1 s be lief that after struggling against the 
Ottoman and European imperialism, the Arabs should not subject them-
selves to a similar situation by replacing the old fo r ces with the new 
fo r ces he referred to as Z ionism and Communism. King Faisal 1 s sue-
cessor has promised to follow his stand on issues like Islamic solidar-
ity, Arab unity, and the liberation of Jerusalem. 
Today, one could say that Saudi Arabia, like other Arab states , 
has compromised partially its basic stance against Israel. The orig-
inal stance of the Arabs was to dismantle Israel completely from the 
Middle East. This p osition has been modified by most Arab nations , 
and they now urge Israel to withdraw within the 1967 borders . 36 
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Saudi Arabia and Pan-Arabism 
Pan-Arabism and anti-Zionism are two issues that have dom-
inated Saudi Arabian policy in the Middle East since the creation of the 
State of Israel. In the 1930 ' s, Saudi Arabia entered into treaties with 
neighboring Arab states on the basis of strengthening Islamic friend-
ship and Arab brotherhood. These treaties were entered into with the 
then three independent Arab states--Yemen, Iraq and Egypt . In 1934, 
the treaty of Taif, which provided for a settlement of differences through 
negotiation, ended the border war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
In 1936, Iraq concluded a treaty of Arab brotherhood with Saudi Arabia. 
In 1945, Saudi Arabia joined the British formed Arab League. 
The original purpose of the Arab League was to strengthen the rela-
tionship between member states . King lbn Saud agreed to join the 
League under the condition that each member state be guaranteed that 
their respective independence and sovereignty would be safeguarded, 
and that each would refrain from attempting to change the form of 
government of any member state. Since then, Saudi Arabian relations 
have been oriented to the individual member states rather than to the 
37 Arab League, as a whole. 
In 1948, when the State of Israel was created, Saudi Arabia 
and the other Arab nations opposed the idea of establishing a Jewish 
homeland in the Arab world, and made contribution to the several 
Arab war efforts against Israel. Since Saudi Arabia does not have a 
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strong military capability, its contribution militarily to the Arab war 
effort against Israel is limited. However, Saudi Arabia has made 
large financial contributions to aid other Arab states fighting the war 
against Israel. 
Egypt is a good example of Arab nations that have received 
aid from Saudi Arabia to fight for the Arab cause against Israel. King 
Ibn Saud I s first official tour abroad was to Egypt. During this period, 
Egypt was economically depressed. The first Arab-Israeli war and a 
corrupt leadership under King Farouk contributed to this problem. Ibn 
Saud offered Egypt a yearly subsidy of approximately $4 million to help 
improve its economy. When Ibn Saud died in 1953, his successor, 
King Saud continued his pan-Arab policy. Under King Saud, Saudi 
Arabia signed a five-year mutual defense pact with Egypt and Syria. 
Also, the armies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria formed a joint com-
mand. King Saud showed his position of neutralism by joining the other 
Arab states that opposed the Baghdad Pact. 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt began to deteriorate 
when President Nasser of Egypt began to adopt his concept of Arab 
Socialism. The Saudi leadership was apprehensive of revolutionary 
incursion into the kingdom, which has always pursued a conservative 
route. After King Saud's visit to the United States in January of 1957, 
he turned away from Nasser and associated himself with the conserva-
tive kings of Jordan and Iraq. 38 King Saud was very concerned over 
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Nasser's growing popularity in the Arab world, and also his pro-
Soviet policies. President Nasser accused King Saud of being a reac -
tionary. The formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between 
Egypt and Syria further aggravated the relations between the two Arab 
states. Saudi Arabia accused Nasser of interfering in the internal 
affairs of other Arab states. Finally, a Saudi plot to assassinate 
Nasser was revealed. 39 Egypt and Saudi Arabia began to pursue dif-
ferent courses. Egypt turned more toward the Soviet Union and Saudi 
Aragia more toward the west. This started a long period of uneasy re-
lations between the two Arab states. The uneasy relationship culmi-
nated into a war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The main cause of 
the confrontation centered around an internal conflict in Yemen. Egypt 
gave military support to the new Republicans in Yemen and Saudia 
Arabia gave support to the Royalists. As a result of the confrontation, 
the Egyptian air force bombed Saudi Arabian towns and villages. 
Finally Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with Egypt and formed 
a joint defense council with Jordan. 
When King Saud was dethroned, Faisal became King of Saudi 
Arabia. Faisal was a better administrator and more pragmatic than 
his predecessor. He resumed a rapproachment between the two Arab 
nations and also restored diplomatic relations. Faisal merely per-
sonified Arab radicalism with Nasser. This brought about a period of 
reconciliation. The new King of Saudi Arabia and Nasser decided to 
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settle the Yemen crisis peacefully. Egypt agreed to withdraw its troops 
from Yemen. 
Israel gained additional territory during the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War. This made Saudi Arabia uneasy. Saudi Arabia was considered 
safe from direct Israeli threat since it does not share any borders with 
the Jewish state. However, after the 1967 war, it was feared that 
Israel might decide to attack Saudi Arabia. At the summit meeting in 
Khartoum, the Arab heads of state decided that there would be no 
direct negotiation, no formal peace, and no recognition between the 
Arab states and Israel. King Faisal proposed that Egypt and Jordan 
be compensated by the Arab oil-producing countries for their war 
losses. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya agreed to put up a combined 
subsidy of $392 million a year for Egypt and Jordan, ~O This move 
triggered by the common threat of Israel removed bitter struggling 
between Saudia Arabia and Egypt. 
King Faisal's outlook of the Arab-Israeli conflict took a drastic 
change after the Khartoum conference: 
As anti-Zionist as he was anti-Communist, the king lavishly 
subsidized Arab governments battling Israel. He grew even 
more bitter against Israel in recent years, most often mak-
ing no distinction between religious Jews (whom he professed 
to respect) and political Zionists, 4l 
When Nasser died, Arab Socialism suffered a setback in the 
Middle East. Nasser ' s successor, Sa da t, has been preoccupied with 
the continuing Arab - Israeli problem, It is believed by many that when 
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King Faisal visited Cairo in 1972, among the various issued discussed, 
the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt, took precedent. The United 
States asked King Faisal to try and convince Sadat to expel the Rus-
sians from Egypt. 
In the Spring of 1972, Washington suggested to Faisal that if 
he would help pursuade President Anwar Sadat to reduce 
Russian presence in Egypt, America would press Israel to 
withdraw from conquered Arab territory. 42 
King Faisal ' s major source of conflict with the United States centered 
around the question of Israel, however he admired the United States 
anti-communist policy. President Nixon was unable to convince Israel 
to withdraw from the Arab territory after Sadat expelled the Russians 
from Egypt. Sadat imposed limited state ownership of property, thus 
denationalizing the various institutions that were nationalized by Nasser. 
Sadat thus adopted an anti- communist stand. 
The Faisal-Sadat relationship had other compelling reasons, 
deeply rooted in inter•Arab politics. Faisal's strongest critic within 
the Arab world was Libya's President Qaddafi, whom Sadat considers 
an irrational person. By gaining influence over Sadat, King Faisal 
minimized the principal appeal Qaddafi has had for a union with Egypt. 43 
Saudi Arabia ' s relations with the other Arab monarchies and the Gulf 
states are fairly normal. Saudi Arabia, under King Faisal has im-
proved relations with revolutionary oriented regimes in Syria, Iraq and 
Algeria. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has an office in 
Saudi Arabia. However, because of Saudi Arabia I s policy of anti-
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communism and Islamic brotherhood, it does not recognize the PLO 
faction led by George Habash, a Christian, who is also suspected to be 
a Communist. Since the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia has become a 
leader within the Arab world. With this role, it has helped mediations 
between Arab states engaged in conflicts of various kinds. And, most 
significant of all, it has aided in bringing an end to the long standing 
differences that existed between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO leader 
Arafat . 
Faisal's successor, King Khalid has so far maintained good re-
lations with most of the Arab states. He has largely followed Faisal I s 
policies in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Saudi Arabian 
role. 
Saudi Arabia and the United States 
Despite American support of Israel and the 1973 Arab oil em-
bargo, relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States have re-
mained fairly normal since officially established in 1940. The kingdom 
has dealt with private American citizens since 1933 when Aramco, 
then Standard of California received an exclusive 60 year oil conces-
sion, from King Abd al-Aziz. Aramco obtained the oil concession on 
May 29, 1933. When a new concession agreement was signed between 
Aramco and Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1939, the king had turned down 
a good offer from Japan. The reason for turning down the Japanese 
offer was that he preferred to contin~e association with the Americans; 
... 
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since it had the advantage of assuring the economic development of the 
country, without incurring political liabilities. 44 
P rivate American oil investments provided the starting point 
for current Saudi-American relations. The U.S. government had no 
direct influence over Aramco's operations in Saudi Arabia until the 
outbreak of World War II. When Italy bombed Dhahran in 1940, this 
halted pilgrim traffic and thus led to loss of revenues for the kingdom. 
Saudi Arabia could not receive any loans from the United States gov-
ernment. President Roosevelt had to suggest to the British govern-
ment to continue making financial assistance available to Saudi Arabia, 
since the region was their sphere of influence. The U.S. government 
later expressed some interest in the British oil concessions in the 
Middle East. However Aramco successfully stopped the government 
from pursuing their expressed interest. The company used its weap-
on, .. the traditional free enterprise suspicion of any government inter-
ference with a penetration into business. 1145 Aramco officials have 
frequently served as informal advisers to the king and his ministers. 
Also, some of these officials have served in the capacity of unofficial 
ambassador in Washington where a company office is maintained. 
Saudi Arabia's friendship with the United States and the con-
stantly gr.owing wealth in oil has given the kingdom great prestige and 
influence in the Arab world. Aleo, King Faisal's role in promoting 
the Palestine cause has made him, as well as the country very popular. 
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The leadership role in the Arab world seems to be passing from Egypt 
to Saudi Arabia. Not only were the Egyptians and other Arabs begin-
ning to pay attention t o the deeds and words emanating from the feudal 
monarchy, but the rest of the w orl d was commencing to flatter King 
Faisal as he became the number one international banker. It has also 
been estimated that within three years Saudi Arabia will have greate r 
financial reserves than the United States, Western Europe and Japan 
combined. 46 The liberation of Jerusalem continues to be the major 
source of conflict between the United States and Saudia Arabia. 
During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia had reluc -
tantly joined the Arab effort to withhold oil only after exten-
sive pressure from Nasser, but lifted the embargo soon after 
its imposigion. In 197 3, it joined with Arab oil-producing 
nations in imposing the oil embarg. Indeed, Saudia Arabia 
forshadowed its major role in the October war when on 
September 4, 1973, King Faisal told Americans via U.S. 
television that American support of Israel makes it ex-
tremely difficult for us to continue to supply the United 
States petroleum needs and even to maintain our friendly re-
lations. 47 
On October 18, 1973, Radio Riyadh announced King Faisal's 
decision to cut down oil production by 10 percent. 48 The following 
day President Nixon asked Congress to supply Israel with $2. 2 billion 
in military ass istance . 49 King Faisal responded by imposing a total 
embargo on the shipment of oil to the United States and the Nether-
lands. SO Faisal also slashed oil production by 26 percent. 5 l 
Aramco operated the oil embargo for Saudi Arabia in a unique 
but none-the-less quite interesting manner. Previously, the oil com-
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panies were regarded as instruments of American foreign policy, to-
ward the oil-producing nations . However, during the 1973 embargo, 
"they were actually used as instruments of Arab policy". SZ Aramco 
complied with the Arabs by cutting off oil supplies to its own homeland. 
In March of 1974, the embargo was lifted, when King Faisal 
was convinced that the United States was working hard to convince 
Israel to withdraw from Arab occupied land. 
In return for lifting the embargo, the United States promised 
to help industrialize Saudi Arabia. On June 8, 1974, broad economic 
cooperation agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
were signed in Washington. The disclosure of the agreements was 
made a few days before President Nixon left for Saudi Arabia on a 
visit. One of the agreements signed by the Secretary of State , Kissin-
ger and Saudi Arabia ' s Prince Fahd lbn Abdul Aziz al Saud , provides 
for the creation of a joint Economic Cooperation Commission. 53 After 
these agreements were signed, the United States sold several squad-
rons of F-SE and F-5F jet fighters in a $756 million package deal to 
the kingdom. 
After President Nixon's visit to Saudi Arabia on June 15, 1974, 
the kingdom leaned further toward the United States. At this point the 
only other major source of misunderstanding between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia was over the soaring price of oil. On this issue, 
Saudi Arabia's oil minister Yamani had made pleas to other OPEC 
member nations to make an effort to hold down the price of oil. 
President Ford took it upon himsE:lf to ~arn the oil-producing 
nations to hold down the prices of oil. This was received with anger 
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by the Iranians and Kuwaitis in particular. King Faisal wrote a per-
sonal letter to the Shah of Iran, urging him to join Saudi Arabia in an 
effort to lower the prices of oil. However, the Shah refused. 54 King 
Faisal made it clear that he was concerned that a worldwide depression 
could hurt the American and western economies, which in turn would 
improve the position of the largely self-sufficient Communist bloc 
nations. 
The relationship that has been cultivated between Saudi Arabia 
and the United States since the 1930s has been maintained with free-
dom to pursue policies not always compatible with each other's objec-
tives. Under normal circumstances, this relationship will continue 
to be as cordial as before, based on mutual respect. The most seri-
ous obstacle that could possibly affect this relationship is an escalated 
United States support of Israel, should another Arab-Israeli war take 
place. This would definitely mean a reimposition of the successful 
weapon used in 1973 against the United States. If an oil embargo should 
be imposed again in the near future, it could prove disastrous for the 
western industrialized nations, not to mention the less fortunate de-
veloping nations. In all probabilities, this will be avoided through 
diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SAUDI POLICY AND THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO 
The October, 1973 Arab-Israeli War as previously indicated 
triggered a turning point in the history of the Arab world, because it 
forced the Arabs to employ oil on a massive scale, as a bargaining 
tool in international relations. History has shown that the use of eco-
nomic resources as an inst rument of political pressure is one of man's 
oldest games. Few wars have been fought that did not have underlying 
economic causes or ties. Nations that have been blessed with ample 
economic resources have used this weapon to achieve political ends. 
The employment of oil as a political weapon has been a recur-
ring idea in Arab political thought since the early forties , and there 
has been two major efforts by the Arabs to use their oil in this capa -
city before 1973. These two previous attempts failed to produce any 
significant political results beyond mere temporary disruptions in 
world oil trade. The first of these attempts occurred after the Anglo-
French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. The flow of oil from Northern 
Iraq to the Mediterranean Coast was interrupted because one of the 
pump stations on the IPC pipeline system transiting Syria was destroyed . 
1973 
1980 
(projection) 
1972 
1980 
(projection) 
TABLE 5 
THE SUPPLY-DEMAND SQUEEZE 
American Oil Demand 
l 7-18 million barrels 
per day (b/d) 
24-27 million b /d 
World Oil Demand 
44. 7 million b/d 
74-78 million b/d 
Amount required from 
Eastern Hemisphere 
3. 5 million b/d approx. 
8-11 million b/d out of 
total imports of 12-15 
million b/d 
Middle East 
Production Required 
18 million b/d 
40-45 million b/d * 
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*This figure cannot be achieved unless Saudi Arabia, whose re-
serves are conservatively estimated at 150 billion barrels (26 per cent 
of the non-communist world's total), consents to an increase of output 
from 8. 3 million b/d (September 1973) to 20 million in 1980. 
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Project Independence Report, 
November 1974. 
The second attempt occurred when several Arab oil-producing 
countries imposed an embargo on oil supplies to the U.S., Britain and 
West Germany following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Arabs suf-
fered defeat in both incidents, and their attempts to use oil as a political 
weapon also failed. Their attempts to apply economic pressure on 
third-party states that were believed to be aiding Israel against the 
Arabs failed. The 1967 oil embargo in particular failed for a number 
of reasons, among which were the following: 
1. The U.S., the main target of the Arab oil weapon was im-
mune to the Arab embargo because it was at that time to-
tally self-sufficient in terms of western hemisphere oil 
supplies. 
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2. The international oil companies did a great job making up 
the shortfall in Arab oil supplies to the embargoed coun-
tries, from other sources despite the closure of the Suez 
Canal. In this case, the focus of the world oil supply shifted 
somewhat from the availability of crude oil at the source to 
the tight situation as regards transportation. 
3 . No quota ceilings were imposed on production, with the re-
sult that no actual physical shortage of oil was created. 
4. There was no uniform interpretation of the coverage of the 
embargo; some of the North African oil countries did not 
in fact withhold supplies from West Germany. 55 
However, many important changes took place within the oil in-
dustry between 1967 and 1973. Many of these changes occurred be-
tween the oil companies and the host governments, which have been 
discussed in earlier chapters of this paper. 
The first serious initiative for the employment of oil as a po-
litical weapon came from Saudi Arabia. This time the oil weapon was 
used successfully. In principle, Saudi Arabia decided to take this ini-
tiative as early as April of 1973. King Faisal sent his oil ministers, 
Mr. Ahmad Zaki Yamani to Washington in April of 1973 with a message 
to the effect that "Saudi Arabia will not significantly expand its present 
oil production unless Washington changes its pro-Israeli s tance in the 
Middle East. 1156 King Faisal reiterated this warning in various state-
ments he made to the press and the most significant was in an inter-
view with Newsweek, published in the September 10, 1973 issue. 
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During this interview, the King emphasized that Saudi Arabia would not 
increase its oil production beyond the limits that can be absorbed by 
its economy, unless two conditions were satisfied: 
First, the U. S, and the west must effectively assist the kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in industrializing itself in order to create an 
alternative source of income to oil, the depletion of which we 
shall be accelerating by increasing production--and also so 
that we can absorb the excess income (see Table 6) resulting 
from production at such a level. Secondly, the suitable po-
litical atmosphere, hitherto disturbed by the Middle East cri-
sis and Zionist expansionist ambitions, must be present. 5 7 
However, when Newsweek published this interview, there was 
no precise indication as to whether Saudi Arabia would take any steps 
if its conditions were not met. There were hints that even if Saudi 
Arabia decided to take steps, it would not do so immediately. It would 
give time to the parties concerned to respond to its conditions. The 
outbreak of the October war and the vast military aid Israel received 
from the U.S. obviously necessitated an earlier implementation of the 
Saudi plans for cutbacks in oil production. This move made by Saudi 
Arabia helped to influence other Arab nati ons to follow, in using oil as 
a political weapon against the U.S. and the west. 
The Saudi Policy During the Boycott Crisis 
The embargo provision discussed in Kuwait was only a recom-
mendation, however the Arab oil-producing countries later adopted it 
as a stated collective policy. As indicated earlier, the initiative to do 
so was taken up first by Saudi Arabia. On October 19 and 20, 1973, 
TABLE 6 
MONETARY RESERVES, MIDDLE EAST OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIEs::c 
(in millions of dollars) 
Country 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 L 974 1975 1976 
Algeria $410 $ 339 $ 507 $ 493 $1, l 43 $ 1,689 $ 1,353 $ l, 987 
Egypt 145 167 161 149 391 342 294 339 
Iran 310 208 621 960 1,237 8,383 8,897 8,833 
Iraq 476 462 600 782 l, 553 3,273 2,727 4,601 
Kuwait 182 203 288 363 501 l, 297 1, 655 l, 929 
Libya 918 ' 1,590 2;665 2,925 2, 127 3,616 2, 195 3,206 
Saudi Arabia 607 662 1,444 2,500 3,877 14,285 23,319 27,025 
Syria 59 55 88 135 481 835 735 36 l 
*A country's international reserves consist of its reserved in gold, SDRs (special drawing rights 
which are unconditional international reserve assets created by the International Monetary Fund), 
its reserve position in the Fund (unconditional assets that arise from a country's gold subscrip-
tion to the Fund and from the Fund's use of a member's currency to finance the drawings of others) 
and its foreign exchange (holdings by monetary authorities--such as central banks, currency 
boards, exchange stabilization funds and Treasuries --of claims on foreigners in the form of bank 
deposits, Treasury bills, government securities and other claims usable in the event of a balance 
of payments deficit). 
SOURCE: Data from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, 
June, 1975, August 1977. 
the Saudi government issued two proclamations stating a whole range 
of restrictive measures that included both general cutbacks and an 
export embargo to specific countries, including the United States. 
Cutbacks were decreed at 10 percent of the September production 
level, instead of the required 5 percent agreed upon at the Kuwait 
meeting, with anticipated further monthly reductions. Numerous 
friendly countries, such as Britain and France, were exempted from 
cutbacks. Othe r Arab countries immediately followed Saudi Arabia's 
example, and within a few days, the Netherlands was also subjected 
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to the embargo. 58 As indicated earlier, the United States was placed 
under an embargo because it was supplying arms to Israel on a large 
scale. The Netherlands was included in the hostile group for several 
reasons, including their offer to replace Austria as a relay centre for 
emigrating Jews (Soviet), ~everal pro-Israeli statements by Dutch · 
leaders, recruitment on Dutch territory--with permission from the 
authorities- -of volunteers for service in Israel, and the use of the 
official Dutch airline KLM, for chartered flights to Israel, in connec-
tion with the Israeli war effort. 59 The embargoes against the United 
States and the Netherlands applied to both direct arid indirect exports, 
i.e., to those initially shipped to third countries in which oil was pro-
cessed or transshipped for final American and Dutch ports, and for 
supplies to the United States Navy. The Saudi embargo also included 
a thir.d category of countries like Trinidad, the Bahamas, the Dutch 
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Antilles, Canada, Puerto Rico, Guam, Singapore, and Bahrein (whose 
refinery was processing 50,000 barrels a day for the United States 
Navy). Also, some European refineries in Italy, Greece and France 
that supplied the American markets or Navy were subjected to full or 
partial embargo. 60 
The Saudi decree thus set a pattern for collective Arab action. 
However, the effects of the boycott policy varied for each producing 
country. The Arab countries that once shipped large volumes to the 
United States and the Netherlands saw a large decrease in their ex-
ports, unlike those that supplied the non-embargoes markets. There 
was no uniform method adopted as to whether the embargo and cut -
backs should be handled incrementally or not, that is, whether the 
decreed cutbacks should be applied prior to or after deducting the 
embargoes volumes. Saudi Arabia applied the incremental method, 
with the result that the Saudi Arabian exports fell by 36 percent, an 
amount the Saudis themselves found slightly disturbing. 61 This situ-
ation largely contributed to the calling of the second conference of 
Arab oil ministers held in Kuwait on November 4, 1973 . The deci-
sions of the conference can be summed up under four points: 
1. The November production was to be reduced uniformly by 
25 percent from the September level, with a further 5 per-
cent planned for December. 
2. This uniform cutback was to include the embargoes to the 
United States and the Netherlands (a non-incremental 
method), which meant that, for other consumers, reduc-
tion in supplies would be less than 25 percent. 
3. Consumer contries were to be warned that a more positive 
attitude toward the Arab cause would have to be taken be-
fore they could qualify for the exempted category. 
4. Saudi Arabia's Yamani and Algeria's Abdel Salam Belaid 
were to tour major consumer countries to explain these 
Arab restrictive measures. 
The European countries responded promptly to the November 
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4th, Kuwait announcement. At a meeting in Brussels on November 6, 
the European Economic Community {EEC) published a declaration 
urging all parties directly involved in the Arab-Israeli war to withdraw 
to the positions occupied on October 22, 1973 (i . e., the original United 
Nations sponsored cease - fire line), and called for a peaceful settle-
ment, which would conform to the Security Council Resolution 242, of 
November 22, 1967. 62 The Arabs saw the EEC ' s statement as a point 
scored by collective Arab diplomacy, and as such it brought great 
satisfaction to the Arab leaders. Encouraged by the EEC move, the 
Arab governments further sought another EEC statement insisting on 
Israeli troop withdrawal from all occupied territories in 1967. How-
ever, the EEC as an organized body refused to issue such a statement . 
So the two Arab ministers, Yamani of Saudi Arabia and Belaid of Al-
geria, sought such a declaration from indivicual EEC member coun-
tries . The countries that agreed to do so were reclassified into the 
exempt category. 
The two meetings held in Kuwait set the basic pattern and 
guidelines to be followed in implementing the oil embargo. What 
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followed was, on the one hand, an elaboration of the initial broad prin-
ciples into a more detailed set of measures and, on the other hand, a 
series of adjustments on the part of the Arab governments in response 
to the changing attitudes of consumers. This modification of the Arab 
oil boycott policy was achieved at the Arab oil ministers meetings in 
Vienna on November 18, 1973, in Kuwait on December 8-9, and again 
on December 24-25, and finally at the Arab summit meeting in Algiers 
on January 2 6-2 8, 1974. 63 
The Algiers summit meeting saw the adoption of several new 
resolutions. The most significant of these resolutions was the one 
tha_t decreed severance of all diplomatic and economic relations- -in-
cluding exports of oil, with Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. 64 
A detailed policy guideline to this effect was set after several meetings 
were held by the Arab oil ministers, By the end of December, 1973, 
the oil consuming nations were divided into four categories as follows: 
l. The most favoured countries, i.e. those entitled not merely 
to the September level of supplies but actually to as much 
as their ovvn requirements dictated. Among these were 
Britain, France, and Spain among the European states, 
Arab importing countries, African states that had broken 
off diplomatic relations with Israel, and Islamic countries. 
2. Friendly countries, i.e. those that modified their policies 
in favour of the Arab cause. To this category belonged 
those countries previously in the neutral group which, due 
to the change of their attitudes toward the Arab cause, be-
came eligible for supplies at the September level (for ex-
ample) Belgium and Japan. 
3. Neutral countries: Those to which general export cutbacks 
applied. Because of their pro-Arab statements of November 
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6, the EEC countries (with the exception of the Netherlands) 
were temporarily placed in a more favoured position within 
this category inasmuch as they were exempted from further 
5 percent general cutbacks promised for December. Later, 
after individual EEC governments--following Yamani ' s and 
Bela id's visits --gave additional assurances to the Arabs, 
they became qualified to be treated as friendly. 
4. Hostile countries to which full embargo applied. These in-
cluded the United States, the Netherlands, and as mentioned 
earlier, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. 65 
The Arab producers were at the initial stage committed to con-
secutive cutbacks of 5 percent per month, in addition to the basic 25 
percent decreed at the second Kuwait meeting. At such a rate, these 
progressive reductions could in due course bring production to zero, 
which those producers with smaller financial reserves could not afford, 
even temporarily. So to try and correct the situation, a secret reso-
lution at the Algiers summit meeting decreed that successive cutbacks 
would only be applied to the point point at which the reduction of a pro-
ducer's revenue reached the maximum of 25 percent of its income for 
1972. 66 An estimate was made indicating that due to the 70 percent 
price increase as compared with 1972, the Arab producers could af-
ford to decrease their output to approximately 45· percent of the 1972 
production level on the average, before their revenue would fall to 75 
percent of the 1972 revenue level. 
Embargo Lifted 
In response t o then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 
reference to possible American couriter ... measures, Yamani declared 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
Abu Dhabi 
Qatar 
Iraq 
Iran 
Algeria 
Libya 
Nigeria 
Indonesia 
Venezuela 
TOTAL 
TABLE 7 
ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES' REVENUES 
( 1960-1980) 
(in millions of dollars) 
1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 
$ 355 $ 655 $1,200 $ 2, 101 $ 2,988 $ 4,915 
465 671 895 l, 439 l, 600 2, 130 
(2) 33 233 418 538 l, 035 
54 69 122 185 247 360 
266 375 521 840 802 l, 465 
285 522 l, 093 1, 934 2,423 3,885 
(3) (3) 381 440 680 1, 095 
(2) 371 1,295 1, 846 1,705 2,210 
(3) (3) 410 883 1,200 1,950 
(3) ( 3) 185 284 480 830 
877 1, 135 1, 104 l, 7 51 1,933 2,800 
$2,303 $3,831 $7,742 $12, 120 $14,515 $22,675 
(continued on next page) 
1974 
$19,400 
7,945 
4,800 
l, 425 
5,900 
14, 930 
3,700 
7,990 
6,960 
2, 150 
10, 010 
$85,210 
SOURCES: 196 0 .. 1910, Petroleum Information Foundation; 1970-71 Petroleum Economics Ltd. , 
Printed in the Congressional Record, Ma r~h 7, 19 74. 
TABLE 7 (continued) 
1975 (4 ) 1980( 4 ) 
Country I Low Medium Highl !Low Medium High I 
Saudi Arabia $22, 150 $22,850 $ 23,500 $ 36,300 $ 43,450 $ 50,550 
Kuwait 8,450 8,700 9,000 10,250 12,250 14,300 
Abu Dhabi 6,400 6,550 6,750 12,400 14,750 17, 150 
Qatar l, 600 1,650 1, 700 2,400 2,900 3,350 
Iraq 7,300 7, 550 7,750 13,650 16,750 19,800 
Iran 16,600 17, l 00 l 7,600 25,650 30,70 0 35 ,750 
Algeria 4,100 4,250 4,350 4,750 5,750 6,700 
Libya 9,750 10,050 10,400 10,550 12,850 15, 100 
Nigeria 8,250 8,500 8,700 11, 350 14,250 l 7, 100 
Indonesia 2, 100 2,200 2,300 2,400 2,950 3,500 
Venezuela 10,200 10,550 10,850 12, 100 14,500 16, 900 
TOTAL $96,900 $99,950 $102,900 $141,800 $171,100 $200,200 
( l) In November 1973 Ecuador became a member of OPEC, and Bagon an associate member; they 
are not included in the above chart. 
(2) Libya and Abu Dhabi started production in 1961 and 1962 respectively. 
{3) Not available. 
( 4) Three estimates: Low-Medium-High. 
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in Copenhagen on November 22. 1973 that any military intervention 
would simply makd the Arabs destroy their oil facilities. 67 Under the 
leadership o f Saudi Arabia, the Arab oil producers in early December 
began to exhibit signs indicating their intention to relax their condi-
tions. Most observers attribute this move to Yamani's visit on De-
cember 5th to the United States. It was believed that Yamani saw that 
the United States was playing an active role as a mediator in the Arab-
Is.raeli conflict. On December 9, the Arab oil ministers, again under 
Saudi Arabian leadership, agreed to tie the lifting of the embargo to 
the adoption of a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab 
territories, including Jerusalem. Again on December 2 5, the minis-
ters agreed to reduce the 25 percent production cutback to 15 percent, 
and cancel the 5 percent reduction scheduled for January. 68 Also en-
couraged by the Washington sponsored Egyptian-Israeli disengagement 
agreement on January 17, 1974, President Sadat began pressing for an 
early end of the oil embargo. Sadat I s proposal met with some diffi-
culties from President Assad of Syria, Boumediene of Algeria and 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. These Arab beads of state opposed the 
proposal simply because the terms of the Egyptian-ls raeli disengage-
ment agreement fell short of the Arab conditions formulated in Decem-
ber, i.e. a timetable for full Israeli withdrawal. The protest of Sadat's 
action was also echoed by Libya's Colonel al-Qadhafi. He even went to 
the extent of boycotting certain joint meetings of the heads of state. 
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Finally, on March 18, the Arab oil ministers during a meeting 
in Vienna, agreed, over Syria's and Libya's negative votes to tempor-
arily lift the embargo against the United States until June 1, 1974. 
The conclusion on May 29, 1974 of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement 
agreement paved the way for two final acts in the embargo drama: On 
June 3, 1974 in Cairo, the ministers tentatively agreed to remove all 
restrictions except for the embargo on the Netherlands, and on July 
11, 1974, this decision became formal, and the ban on the Netherlands 
was lifted as well. The boycott crisis came to an end, nevertheless, 
in their June and July statements, the ministers warned that embargoes 
could be reimposed if a new war broke out. 
\. 
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CHAPTER V 
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES 
The post-embargo period has witnessed serious attempts by 
major oil consuming nations to lessen their dependence on foreign 
energy sources- -particularly oil. This is striking! y true for the 
United States. I chose the United States because it was the main tar-
get of the 1973 oil embargo. Also, it is one of the large st energy 
consuming nations in the world. The Carter administration has given 
energy efficiency a high priority, and to illustrate this, he has created 
a new energy department. 
The oil producing nations are also concerned about their oil. 
They are aware of the fact that it cannot last forever, so they must 
conserve . 
The Quest for Energy Security 
In the Summer of 1972, a top United States Department of 
State official, John Irwin, held a personal conference with the various 
agency heads responsible for energy matters. He warned them that 
the U.S. was increasing its dependence on foreign energy supplies--
mainly oil. He concluded that this could hamper the United States 1 
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freedom to conduct its foreign policy. This is the first time that energy 
received a high level of attention from the U.S. foreign policy machin-
ery. Nothing spectacular came of his efforts at the time, though some 
shared his concern. A lack of cohesive energy policy continued to 
exist, thus expanding dependence on foreign oil, principally Middle 
Eastern oil; until at least the 1980s. It was not until September 1973, 
when President Nixon indicated in a speech that the United States can-
not be at the mercy of the Middle Eastern oil producers, that formal 
recognition that the security of U.S. energy was in jeopardy, finally 
reached the top level of foreign policy. 69 When the Arabs imposed 
the oil boycott on the U.S., short-term crisis measures were adopted, 
but not seriously enforced. 
President Nixon, again in a speech on November 7, 1973 , ad-
vocated what he termed "project independence" in energy. A few 
weeks later, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission gave the 
president a $10 billion, five-year plan for an energy research and de-
velopment budget that outlined measures for moving to self-sufficiency 
by 1980-85. Again in an energy related mes sage to Congress on Janu-
ary 23 , and in his State of the Union address on January 30, 1974, 
President Nixon outlines a program for energy self-sufficiency, adding 
that, since 1970 was a year of the environment, 1974 should be the 
year of energy. 70 
On February 11, 1974, a high-level conference of the major 
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energy-deficient consuming states was held in Washington, at the invi-
tation of President Nixon. Various aspects relating to energy were 
discussed, and a possible remedial measure, among others, agreed 
upon was, sharing knowledge in the area of energy conservation and 
research and development. So energy finally became a highly regarded 
international issue. 
President Nixon's project independence was supposed to ac-
complish three major tasks, according to him. They were: To rapid-
ly increase domestic energy supplies, reduce demand by conserving 
energy, and finally to develop new technologies through massive new 
research and development programs. Several people were skeptical 
about the success of project independence, considering its aims and 
the time frame given for the realization of these aims. However, it 
was an important thing, since for the first time, the nation was alerted 
to the hazard facing the security of its energy and was beginning, or 
at least attempting to do something about it. 
The post - embargo period did not improve too much for project 
independence and several of the recommendations that accompanied it. 
The United States could not adjust domestic energy policies to accord 
with the newly sensed foreign energy realities. Prior to the oil em-
bargo, the United States was skeptical of the existence of any energy 
related problems. When it became clear that such a problem did exist 
after all, the only clear cut solution was to serach for scapegoats. 
This attitude continued through the embargo period. The Carter ad-
ministration is finally trying to settle down to deal seriously with the 
problem. He has so far brought the various energy related agencies 
together under one newly created cabinet level department, This is 
indeed a giant step in the right direction. 
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The focus of world attention in international energy trade has 
been on oil. There is, however, a significant amount of trade in 
electricity, coal, and natural gas as well. As the Arabs are finding 
out , prospects for more nuclear power plants also seem bright, which 
could be translated into less dependence on oil. At present, nuclear 
power plants are a sensitive commodity. One major concern is that 
nuclear fuel could be diverted to weapons by terrorist or various ex-
tremist groups, Nuclear power plants nonetheless might have a bright 
future (see Table 8), and will be in significant international demand, 
both because of the high price and possible scarcity of other energy 
sources, and because of the eventual warning of the world's fossil 
fuel supply. Some of the Middle East oil producing countries, includ-
ing Saudi Arabia have suggested that oil and gas be conserved for such 
long-term use as petro-chemicals, and that the w orld should turn 
quickly to less exhaustible energy sources, such as nuclear power. 71 
The United States exports coal, mainly to Europe, Japan and 
Canada, and in turn imports natural gas (over 4 % of U.S. consumption 
comes from Canada). The Canadians however, for the sake of conser-
\ 
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vation, have limited both gas and oil exports. 
TABLE 8 
WESTERN EUROPE: F ORECAST O F NUCLEAR CAPACITY (106kw) 
Country 1975 1980 1985 2000 
Austria 1. 2 2.4 9.2 
Belgium 1. 5 3. S 6. 0 14. 7 
Finland o. 5 1. 7 3.7 16. 5 
Francd 3.0 6.2 18.3 80.0 
West Germany 6.9 25. 8 51. 0 175. 0 
Great Britain 12.6 29. 0 49. 0 208.0 
Greece 1. 0 2.5 18. 0 
Ireland o. 5 4.0 
Italy 1. 4 8.0 24.0 140.0 
Netherlands 0. 5 1. l 3.0 40.0 
Norway 0. 6 1. 6 22.0 
Portugal 0. 5 1. 5 5.0 
Spain 1. 0 s. 5 14.0 69.0 
Sweden 3. 3 8. 0 14.0 42.5 
Switzerland 1. 0 2. 7 4.3 13. 5 
Turkey 0. 5 2.0 11. 0 
Total 31. 7 95.3 198.3 868.4 
SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute - IP 71 
Beginning in the early 1970s, both industry and government 
seriously considered the idea of importing liquid natural gas (LNG). 
This idea was first put into practice when Algeria imported some LNG 
to New England. However, the LNG projects are costly in capital and 
land. There are some proposals for LNG from Siberia, which has 
large gas reserved, for the east and west coast. Launching a massive 
LNG import program will definitely impair energy security and foreign 
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dependence that the U.S. is now trying to curb. The U.S. must learn 
to conserve its gas. It is estimated that 60 percent of gas is burned 
wastefully under industrial boilers. The U.S. must also attempt to 
conserve energy by switching to other fuels, by increasing production 
of, for example, offshore discoveries, and Rocky Mountain gas with 
nuclear or other stimulation, and by coal gasification. Gas require-
ments pose almost the same problems as oil, except that gas lacks 
some of the energy-insecurity temptation of oil, because it has been 
more difficult to import from overseas. 72 
No. 
No. 
No. 
No. 
No. 
Case 
l (1970) 
2 (1971) 
3 (1968) 
4 (1971) 
TABLE 9 
ENERGY DEMAND AND COMPOSITION OF 
PRIMARY ENERGY IN 2000 (%) 
Total 
10 tns Petroleum Coal Gas Hydro 
25 32 20 16 4 
25 59 
30 26 24 23 5 
36-39 55 11 30 4 
SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute - IP 71 
Nuclear 
28 
22 
A U.S. "energy gap 11 will continue to exist for at least a while. 
This gap will have to be filled by imports and /or drastic measures, 
such as allocations and rationing. The interpenetration of domestic 
energy programs--those that increase or expand domestic production 
and those that decrease demand- -and of foreign affairs--both policies 
and substantial import programs --should clearly be apparent. The 
TABLE 10 
URANIUM RESERVES AND REQUIREMENTS 
Requirements through 1985 
United States 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
West Germany 
France 
W. Europe Other 
Foreign Other 
Total 
Reserves - -$10 / LBU 3 08 
United States 
South and Southwest Africa 
Canada 
France, Gabon, Niger 
Australia 
Others 
Total 
Thousands of 
tons U308 
474 
106 
92 
65 
40 
10 7 
116 
1. 000 
Thousands of 
tons U 308 
330 
300 
236 
124 
92 
68 
1, 15 0 
SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute - IP 71 
TABLE 11 
70 
o/c 
47 
10 
9 
7 
4 
1 1 
12 
--
100 
% 
29 
26 
20 
1 1 
8 
6 
100 
FORECAST OF NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY UP TO 2000 (l06kw) 
End of year 
1980 
1985 
1990 
2000 
USA 
132 
280 
508 
1, 200 
(37) 
Other 
141 
303 
578 
1, 460 
(44) 
Communist 
Bloc 
20 
56 
146 
600 
( 19) 
Total 
293 
639 
l, 2 32 
3,260 
(100) 
SOURCE: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission - Nuclear Power 
1943-200-WASH-l 13p. 
more the U.S. produces and conserves, the less it will be dependent 
on insecure foreign sources of supply, and hence the less subject to 
"political coercion II and balance - of- trade problems. 
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There is no doubt that energy will reamin for quite a while as 
the pri mary component of the international economic scene , and will 
greatly influence other areas of foreign policy, fo r both producer and 
consumer nations. The oil - producing nations presently do not have a 
need for nuclear weapons, o r even powerful in gaining international 
recognition. Today , oil is power. We must live with and accept this 
fact. The post - World War II focus was on the Cold War and Commu-
nism; a threat that decreased just in time for the United States to be 
replaced by a more important and acute concern, in both domestic and 
foreign policy, over the l ong-term energy problem. 
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MAP 2 
The Nuclear Power Grid 
(States sized according to their populations) 
THE NUCLEAR POWER GRID 
(states sized according to their population) 
S OURCE: Cited in Newsweek, December 10, 1973. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The motivation underlying the use of Arab oil as a political 
weapon is a faiTly direct one. It stems from the mounting Arab des-
peration a t the failure of the world community to ensure the implemen-
tation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22 , 1967, 
which stated , among other things, that Israel withdraw from Arab 
terriroty occupied in the 196 7 war, that the political independence of 
every state in the area be recognized and that a settlement of the 
Palestinian question be made. Six years had passed since the 1967 
war with no firm action being taken by the world community to enforce 
this resolution. Nothing seemed capable of stopping the continuous 
erosion of Arab rights which had been going on since the creation of 
the State of Israel. 
Meanwhile, Arab oil continued to contribute to the development 
of the non-Arab world. But somehow, it seemed incapable of restor-
ing the p olitical rights of several million Arabs who are presently 
stateless, or aid those Arab countries which had lost sizeable parts 
of thei r territory, to regain them. This contradiction continued to 
worry the Arab conscience until Arab patience finally ran out, and 
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war broke out for the fourth time in a quarter of a century. At this 
stage, Arab oil was brought in to ensure that another war had not been 
fought in vain . It is an attempt to spread the effects of the conflict as 
widely as possible, in order to provide countries importing Arab oil 
with a stake in the future stability of the Middle East, and to persuade 
them to safeguard their stake, by applying maximum pressure on the 
party that holds the key to a solution of the problem, This, of course, 
is the United States which, by virtue of its role as the major supporter 
and protector of Israel, is in a position to persuade the Israelis to act 
with reason. The Arab oil embargo therefore was aimed at bringing 
pressure on the U. S , in two ways: Firstly, from within, by denying 
the U.S. the amounts of Arab oil which it needs to meet its growing 
demand at home. This might force the U, S. government to try and 
work genuinely for peace in the Middle East. Secondly, from without, 
by denying Japan, the European Economic Community and other coun-
tries of the world, varying proportions of their requirements of Arab 
oil in the hope that the governments of these nations will, as a matter 
of self-interest, bring maximum pressure to bear on the U.S. , in 
order to stabilize the Middle East situation. 
Oil will remain the crucial source of energy in the near future, 
that is within the next two decades. During th.is period, the United 
States and Saudi Arabia will dominate the world energy scene. The 
United States will still remain the largest consumer of oil, even if 
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the principles laid down in "project independence" are adherred to; 
Saudi Arabia will most likely remain the largest producer of oil sim-
ply because it holds the largest known oil reserves. The hard strug-
gle toward energy self-sufficiency in the United States through conser-
vation, exploration and various other means might reduce America I s 
dependence on imported oil, within the time frame heretofore indicated. 
However, should another Arab-Israeli war take place in the near fu-
ture, the Arabs will definitely use the oil weapon. The western indus -
trialized nations as well as developing nations cannot afford such an 
economic blow. 
When oil ceases to be an important source of energy, either 
b ecause it has been exhausted or because of alternative energy sources 
have been found , the Arabs still can use their financial weapon if it 
becomes necessary to do so in the years ahead. They can put their 
financial weapon into action by withdrawing their petro-dollar s from 
the American, British and other European banks. This could cause 
wide-spread financial chaos, that the western industrialized nations 
know can prove very detrimental to them. So the Arab oil producing 
nations and Saudi Arabia in particular will continue to be influential 
in inte r national relations. Saudi Arabia w ill continue to play an influ-
ential role within the Arab and muslim world. They will continue to 
support t he Palestinian cause to maintain their influential status. 
The oil weapon alone might not settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, 
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however it will serve whenever applied, to put pressure on those that 
can influence the outcome of the Arab-Israeli dispute--particularly 
the United States. This is very significant. 
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Arab oil was for several years kept away from politics and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who was 
well-inown to be an avowed enemy of two institutions-- Zionism and 
Communism--was very reluctant to use the oil weapon against the 
United States. However he was provoked into doing so to a large de-
gree because of the large volume of U.S. arms aid to Israel during 
the October, 1973 war. 
This thesis predicts that the present Saudi leadership will be 
forced to use the oil weapon again if it becomes necessary. Israel is 
aware of this, the United States and other industrialized nations are 
also aware of this, as well as the non-oil producing nations (develop-
ing ). The Saudi leadership knows that their participation is crucial 
to the success of an oil embargo. Their will to support the Palestin-
ian cause will overshadow many differences they might encounter 
whenever they participate in an oil embargo. 
In short, Saudi Arabia has grown from a poor and backward 
desert kingdom to a prosperous financial super-power. The kingdom 
may never become a military super-power, however it is in a position 
today to make the military super-powers listen when it speaks. This 
is power in itself. This power is derived from oil. Saudi Arabia's 
77 
population is small compared to the size of the kingdom. The kingdom 
is enjoying rapid development. Through its oil and financial power, 
Saudi Arabia has managed on behalf of the Arabs and Islam in particu-
lar to isolate Israel and Zionism from the world community. 
APPENDIX A 
STATISTICAL TABLES 
TABLE l2 
OIL EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 
JANUARY-AUGUST, 1974 
Exporting Country 
Canada 
Nigeria 
Iran 
Venezuela 
Saudi Arabia 
Indonesia 
Algeria 
E cuador 
Trinidad 
United Arab E mirates 
Angola 
Others 
Total 
Thousands 
of Barrels 
896.4 
633.8 
561. 9 
405. 1 
301. 0 
283.7 
195.7 
78.7 
78. 6 
62.6 
47.3 
8 0. l 
3,624.9 
78 
Percent of 
U.S. Imports 
24.7 
1 7. 5 
15. 5 
11. 2 
8. 3 
7.8 
5. 4 
2.2 
2.2 
1. 7 
1. 3 
2.2 
l 00. 0 
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration figures in the Wash-
ington Post, October 24, l 974. 
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TABLE 13 
OIL CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION AND NET TRADE, 
BY MAJOR WORLD REGIONS, 1972 
i:: ID U'J 0 i:: ...... ...... ..... k "O . k "O . ...... "O 0 "O U'J "O 0.. ........ . ... -... 0 ........ C: 0 ........ 0 s ...0 ti ...0 0.. ...0 0 0.. ...0 M s O >< ::, 0 ::, 0 u 
~o 0.. 
a> 0 "O 0 HO ~ 0 ~ 
C: 0 Oo ...... 0 0 ...... 0 0 
0 • M Q) • Q) • 
u- ~..: z - # z- # 
United States 15,980 ll, 180 4,515 23.8 
Canada 1, 665 1,835 170 9.3 
Carribbean 1, 195 3,650 2,450 67. 1 
Other Western 
Hemisphere 2,-105 1,325 770 36.6 
Western Europe 14,205 435 13,735 96.7 
Middle East 1, 145 17,975 16,830 93.6 
North Africa 370 3,745 3,375 90. l 
West Africa 200 2,085 1,885 90.4 
East and South 
Africa, South 
Asia 975 86 880 90.3 
South East Asia l, 430 1,295 125 8.7 
Japan 4,800 143 4, 765 99.3 
Oceania 635 306 300 47.2 
USSR, Eastern 
Europe, China 7,990 8,865 880 9.9 
TOTAL 52,695 52,925 
SOURCE: The Petroleum Economist, March, 1974. 
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TABLE 14 
ESTUvfATED OIL EXPORTS AND REVENUES OF 
MAJOR OP EC COUNT RIES 
A. Government Oil Revenues millions of U. S, dollars 
Saudi Arabia 1,200 2, 149 3, 107 5, 100 
Kuwait 895 1,400 l, 657 1, 900 
Iran 1, 136 l, 944 2,380 4, 100 
Iraq 521 840 575 1,500 
United Arab 
Emirates 233 431 551 900 
Qatar 122 198 255 400 
Libya 1,295 1,766 1,598 2,300 
Algeria 325 350 700 900 
Nigeria 411 915 1, 174 2,000 
Venezuela l, 406 1, 702 1,948 2,800 
Indonesia 185 284 429 900 
7,729 11, 9 79 14,374 22,800 
B. Oil Exports millions of barrels 
Saudi Arabia 1,359 1, 707 2, 163 2,850 
Kuwait 1,082 1, 169 1, 176 1,078 
Iran 1,318 1,562 1,752 2,037 
Iraq 545 594 382 705 
United Arab 
Emirates 253 339 384 555 
Qatar 133 156 176 208 
Libya 1, 188 989 813 794 
Algeria 358 276 373 382 
Nigeria 376 531 628 715 
Venezuela 1, 288 l, 206 1, 133 1, 170 
Indonesia 265 273 345 426 
8, 165 8,802 9,325 l 0, 92 0 
c. Government Oil Revenues 
2er barrel of exports u. s. dollars 
Saudi Arabia • 883 1. 259 l. 437 l. 789 
Kuwait • 828 l. 197 l. 409 1. 763 
Iran • 862 1. 246 l. 358 2,023 
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20,000 
7,000 
17,400 
6,800 
4,100 
1,600 
7,600 
3,700 
7,000 
l O, 6 00 
3,000 
88,800 
3,060 
905 
2,072 
670 
614 
189 
547 
350 
785 
998 
460 
10,650 
6.535 
7.734 
8,397 
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TABLE 14- -Continued 
Iraq • 957 1. 415 l. 507 2. 127 10. 149 
United Arab E. 
Emirates .920 1. 272 1. 434 1. 621 6.677 
Qatar • 915 1. 264 1. 445 l. 923 8.465 
Libya 1. 090 1. 786 l. 966 2,896 13,893 
Algeria .907 l. 268 l. 877 2.356 10,571 
Nigeria 1. 093 1,722 1,870 2,797 8.917 
Venezuela l. 092 1. 411 1. 719 2.393 1 o. 621 
Indonesia .698 1. 040 1. 243 2. 112 6.521 
Average per 
Barrel Revenues 
All Countries • 946 1.360 1. 541 2.087 8. 338 
SOURCE: The Petroleum Economist, March, 1974. 
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TABLE 15 
SUPPLY OF CRUDE OIL FROM ARAB AND NON-ARAB SOURCES 
TO SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES BY THE FIVE U.S. MAJORS, 
EMBARGO PERIOD COMPARED WITH BASE PERIOD 
(thousands of barrels daily unless otherwise noted) 
N 
"O r") k t- 0 r- • Cl) Cl) 
"' .a .... "' ..c I O a, P,. .... (.) k .... u bO (\I 
"O • I,.; Cl) I,.; ] ~~(\I ~ 
o "" ro p.. ,: ro (1.) .0 "t:J a, nS 
·.::Cl)~ o~~ u E C nS a::i 
IV s ,.C C ro bO E ..c IV [ii "t:J "C .._. 'tl ~ bl) .... bl) 
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«s Cl .a "' .... ~ Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) a::i - ........ Ci19,£~ Cl .. ~ ~ l) ~ 
United States 
Arab 395 35 -91 
Non-Arab 966 1, l 04 14 
Total 1,359 1, 13 7 -16 
Japan 
Arab 661 817 24 
Non-Arab 898 689 -23 
--
Total 1,558 1,506 
-
3 
United Kingdom 
Arab 516 794 54 
Non-Arab 148 62 -58 
663 857 29 
France 
Arab 410 442 8 
Non-Arab 46 31 -33 
Total 455 472 4 
West Germany 
Arab 721 721 0 
Non-Arab 117 109 -7 
Total 837 827 -1 
Netherlands 
Arab 701 18 -97 
Non-Arab 131 430 228 
--
Total 831 447 -46 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, April 8, 1974. 
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TABLE 16 
U.S. IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 
BASE PERIOD COMPARED WITH AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 
1973 AND JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1974 
(thousands of barrels daily unless 
otherwise noted) 
Base 
Period Difference 
Country (Dec. Aug. - Jan. - Between 
of 1972 Sept. Feb., Columns 
Origin through 1973 1974 2 and 3 
March 
1973) 
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(l) (2 ) (3) Absolute Per Cent 
Total 3, 190 4, 114 2,885 -1,229 - 30 
Total, 
Arab States 730 1, 2 03 19 -1, 184 -98 
Total, 
Non-Arab States 2,460 2,911 2,886 45 - 2 
Venezuela 516 633 493 140 -22 
Canada 1, 116 1,082 960 122 -11 
Nigeria 334 524 462 62 -12 
Iran 113 229 230 201 88 
Indonesia 126 237 275 38 16 
All other 
Non-Arab 206 206 246 40 19 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, April 8, 1974. 
APPENDIX B 
(MAPS) 
MAP 3 
- - . -·; --.-
The Worldwide Search for 011 
MIDEAST AND NORTH AFRICA hold more 
than 70 per cent of free world's reserves of oil, 
but now the search is on in every comer of the 
globe lo find new and more secure sources. 
Source: U.S. News & World Report, December 30, 1974. 
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ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 
EG1Pr 
Gu tf r4" Sue3 ,,,. 
/ 
Gulf~ A 
Date 
1973 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 5-9 
Sept. 15- 16 
Oct. 6 
Oct. 7 
Oct. 8- l 0 
Oct. 16 
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APPENDIX C 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE OIL CRISIS 
Location 
Tripoli 
Algiers 
Vienna 
Sinai and 
Golan 
Baghdad 
Vienna 
Kuwait 
Event 
Libya nationalizes 51 percent of the inter-
ests of Esso Libya/Sirte, Mobil, Shell, 
Gelsenberg, Texaco, Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia, Libyan-American (Atlantic Rich-
field), and Grace. 
Conference of less-developed countries 
approves forming "producers I associa-
tions, 11 calls for withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from occupied Arab lands. 
35th OPEC conference designates Abu 
Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatair, and 
Saudi Arabia (the Gulf Six) to negotiate col-
lectively with the companies over prices. 
Other OPEC members to negotiate individ-
ually. 
Beginning of the Arab-Israeli War. 
Iraq nationalizes the holdings of Exxon and 
Mobil in the Basrah Petroleum Company, 
corresponding to 23, 75 percent equity in 
the company. 
· OPEC ministerial committee of the Gulf 
Six meets with oil companies' representa-
tives to discuss revision of the 1971 Teheran 
agreement and oil prices. Negotiations fail. 
The Gulf Six unilaterally raise the posted 
price of Saudi market crude from $3. 011 to 
$5. 119 per barrel. 
Date 
Oct. 17 
Oct. 19-20 
Oct. 23 - 28 
Nov. 4-5 
Nov. 18 
Nov. 19-20 
Nov. 23 
Dec. 9 
Dec, 22-24 
Dec. 24-25 
......... . . 
Location 
Kuwait 
Riyadh 
et. a 1. 
Kuwait 
Vienna 
Vienna 
Algiers 
Kuwait 
Teheran 
Kuwait 
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Event 
Arab oil ministers agree on the use of oil 
weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a man-
datory cut in exports, and a recommended 
embargo against unfriendly states. 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states pro-
claim an embargo on oil exports to the 
United States 
Oil embargo extended to the Netherlands by 
Arab States . 
Arab oil ministers agree to cut production 
by 25 percent of the September level, the 
cutback to include volumes embargoes to 
the unfriendly states; Arab oil policy to be 
explained in consumer countries by special 
emissaries. 
Arab oil ministers cancel the scheduled 5 
percent cut in production for EEC. 
OPEC's 36th conference endorses decisions 
for the Gulf Six. 
Arab summit conference adopts open and 
secret resolutions on the use of the oil 
weapon. Embargo extended to Portugal, 
Rhodesia, and South Africa. 
Arab oil ministers announce a further pro-
duction cut of 5 percent for January; friend-
ly c ountries exe mpted. 
OPEC ministerial committee of the Gulf Six 
decides to raise posted price of marker ·. 
crude to $ 11. 651 per barrel effective Janu-
ary l, 1974. 
Arab oil ministers cancel the 5 percent pro-
duction cut scheduled for January and agree 
on a change in the production cut from 25 to 
15 percent of the September level. 
• _,
Date 
1974 
Feb. 12-14 
March 13 
March 17 
June 1-3 
July 10-11 
Location 
Algiers 
Tripoli 
Vienna 
Cairo 
Cairo 
88 
Event 
Heads of state of Algeria, Egypt, Syria, 
and Saudi Arabia discuss oil strategy in 
view of the progress in Arab-Israeli disen-
gagement. 
Arab oil ministers agree to end the embargo 
against the United States and to restore pro-
duction to pre-October levels. Formal an-
nouncement to be postponed. 
Arab oil ministers announce end of the em-
bargo against the United States. 
Arab oil ministers decide to end most re-
strictions on exports of oil , but continue 
embargo against the Netherlands, Portugal , 
South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Arab oil ministers lift the embargo against 
the Netherlands. 
SOURCE: Daedalus, Fall 1975. 
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